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Flipping the Script on Brady
ION MEYN*
Brady v. Maryland imposes a disclosure obligation on the prosecutor and, for this
reason, is understood to burden the prosecutor. This Article asks whether Brady also
benefits the prosecutor, and if so, how and to what extent does it accomplish this?
This Article first considers Brady’s structural impact—how the case influenced
broader dynamics of litigation. Before Brady, legislative reform transformed civil
and criminal litigation by providing pretrial information to civil defendants but not
to criminal defendants. Did this disparate treatment comport with due process?
Brady arguably answered this question by brokering a compromise: in exchange for
imposing minor obligations on the prosecutor at trial, the Court signaled to the
prosecutor that to withhold information before trial does not violate due process.
This Article also explores Brady’s narrative treatment. This Article contends that
the narrative that Brady imposes a significant burden on prosecutors, despite
scholarly efforts to move past it, is pervasive. This narrative of prosecutorial burden
confers unearned legitimacy to case outcomes. This Article finally examines how
prosecutorial interests have deployed Brady politically, focusing on how the
Department of Justice has wielded the Brady obligation to deflect political attempts
to expand pretrial discovery.
In the attempt to provide a fuller account of the case’s benefits and burdens on
litigants, this Article suggests the possibility that Brady can also be viewed as a
prosecutorial ally. This Article uses this possibility as an opportunity to consider
alternative approaches to assessing whether the criminal pretrial procedural regime
comports with due process.

* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. The author is grateful to
those who provided close review, including Alafair Burke, Keith Findley, Brandon Garrett,
Carissa Hessick, Alexandra Huneeus, Eisha Jain, Cecilia Klingele, Gerald Leonard, Daniel
McConkie, Daniel Medwed, Justin Murray, Eve Brensike Primus, David Schwartz, Miriam
Seifter, Jonathan Witmer-Rich, and Ronald Wright. The author expresses special thanks for
the research assistance of Rachel Dykema and Farah Famouri.
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INTRODUCTION
Brady v. Maryland, a landmark case in the criminal procedure canon, will confound
those who attempt to frame it. The case’s command—that a prosecutor must turn
over material information favorable to a defendant1—has left a legacy of
contestation. Some celebrate the case for announcing a bold vision of due process.2
Others lament that a conservative doctrinal countermand dashed any potential.3

1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES,
AND PERSPECTIVES 892 (5th ed. 2013) (“The Court’s first constitutional discovery case was a
‘shot heard ‘round the world.’”); RUSSELL L. WEAVER, LESLIE W. ABRAMSOM, RONALD
BACIGAL, JOHN M. BURKOFF, CATHERINE HANCOCK, DONALD E. LIVELY & JANET C. HOEFFEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES: PROBLEMS & EXERCISES 888 (3d ed. 2007) (“Brady’s due
process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence overrides any limitations on discovery
provided for by a jurisdiction’s discovery statutes or rules.”). Justice Marshall would assert the
“original theory and promise of Brady” was to be as broad as the duty of the prosecutor to
disclose all evidence in his files that “might reasonably be considered favorable” to the
defendant’s case. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 702 (1985).
3. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686
(2006) (“Reflecting on this landmark decision forty-three years later, one is struck by the
dissonance between Brady’s grand expectations to civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim
reality of its largely unfulfilled promise.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1535–36 (2010) (arguing that subsequent Brady decisions have
failed to live up to the ideals of the original decision); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis:
The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
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Almost all commentators perceive the case as a benefit to the defendant and a burden
to the prosecutor. But might Brady also confer certain benefits to prosecutors? This
Article recasts Brady as a potential prosecutorial ally in important respects, raising
new questions over the doctrine’s ability to ensure due process in criminal disputes.
One benefit that Brady conferred to prosecutors is structural in nature. Under
common law, civil and criminal disputes shared a similar procedural template.
Before Brady was decided, a federal effort was launched to reform civil litigation.4
The transformative result simplified pleading, permitted joinder of claims, and
created a pretrial discovery phase.5 The federal reform effort then took up criminal
litigation with a proposal that mirrored the civil template.6 But the final draft did not
include pretrial discovery for criminal disputes. Did a system that afforded pretrial
information to civil defendants, but not to criminal defendants, comport with due
process?
This Article argues that Brady implicitly resolved this question. By constraining
due process review to the trial moment, Brady fortified prosecutorial power over the
distribution of information during pretrial proceedings, where virtually all cases
(ninety-five percent) resolve.7 As to the five percent of criminal cases that advance
to trial, defendants in those cases have no constitutional right to any pretrial
disclosures—however essential such information might be to preparing for trial. In
carving out an unused space (trial) to constitutionally insist on prosecutorial
disclosure, the Court signaled that the pretrial record was free from constitutional
scrutiny. Under this view, Brady can be understood to have validated the larger
procedural project in the late 1930s and early 1940s to reform litigation, a
restructuring that significantly favored prosecutorial interests.
Another benefit that Brady confers to prosecutorial interests is narrative.
Narratives generated in law school curriculum, scholarship, and popular accounts
portray Brady to impose on the prosecutor a duty to do damage to her own case.8

77 (2012).
4. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 961 (1987).
5. Id. at 923–34.
6. Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 706–07 (2017).
7. See RICK JONES, GERALD B. LEFCOURT, BARRY J. POLLACK, NORMAN L. REIMER &
KYLE O’DOWD, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL AND HOW TO SAVE IT 14, 62 n.2 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org
/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixth-amendme
nt-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DCCW6PJ] (finding that approximately ninety-seven percent of federal criminal cases are resolved
before trial); Erica Goode, Stronger Hands for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judgesafter-rulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/2Z55-NGBW] (reporting that “97 percent
of federal cases and 94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains”).
8. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale
of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 643–44 (2002) (“Brady is often heralded
as the Supreme Court case that granted the criminally accused a constitutional right to
discovery. . . . Certainly when I first started teaching Brady, I taught it from this heroic
viewpoint.”).
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Portraying Brady as requiring a self-inflicted wound enhances the image of the
prosecutor as a minister of justice who searches for the truth, and not for any
particular result. This portrayal helps conceal the reality that the prosecutor has
license to engage in truth-suppressing tactics during the pretrial period. Often
portrayed as a game-changing doctrine that reflects a special concern for due process
in the criminal arena, an inflated narrative distributes significant benefits to
prosecutorial interests in conferring legitimacy, however unearned, to outcomes.
This Article also examines a political use of the case that has furthered
prosecutorial interests. In individual cases, prosecutors will always argue Brady is
limited to trial, and the Court has agreed. Despite this agreement that Brady does not
apply to pretrial proceedings, in the political arena, prosecutorial interests have
argued that the Brady burden should protect them against legislative efforts to expand
pretrial discovery. In this way, prosecutors not only have relied on Brady to limit the
constitutional review of information to the trial phase but have effectively deployed
Brady to beat back legislative proposals to expand pretrial discovery.
In identifying how Brady has potentially distributed benefits to prosecutorial
interests, this Article is situated within scholarship that questions how rights, within
political and social contexts, can work to reinforce entrenched power.9 In providing
a lens to understand Brady not just as a check on executive power but also as a
doctrine of executive empowerment, this Article questions prevailing explanations
of Brady’s role in criminal disputes, and it further questions whether the Court’s
present approach adequately addresses process concerns in criminal disputes.
In Part I, this Article turns to Brady’s origin story, examining its doctrinal roots
and how the legal community initially received the case. This Part also seeks to
situate Brady within the political context: the case followed political reform that
dramatically altered litigation and increased prosecutorial power. Part II considers
the structural, narrative, and political implications of Brady that potentially distribute
benefits to prosecutorial interests. Part III uses the possibility that Brady is a
prosecutorial ally to consider alternative approaches to assessing whether the
criminal pretrial procedural regime comports with due process.
I.

BRADY, A MODEST DOCTRINE, A MOMENTOUS IMPACT

Decided in 1963, Brady announced a prosecutor must disclose evidence
“favorable” to the defendant and “material” to the case.10 Brady is considered a
landmark due process case. Brady’s vague language is subject to contestation, though

9. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1999); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
(2007); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To:
The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425–26 (2016); Lani Guinier,
From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestDivergence Dilemma 91 J. AM. HIST. 1 (2006); Alice Ristroph, Power-Conferring Criminal
Procedure (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (revealing how a
constitutional right has a power-conferring nature—that is, in creating a zone of regulation,
the Court facilitates the exercise of state power within these constraints).
10. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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much of the debate surrounding Brady’s meaning and importance is of a recent
vintage. As post-conviction litigation took on new significance with a growing
innocence movement, Brady’s visibility increased, as did scrutiny.11 Some viewed
Brady’s disclosure obligations to be significant, early enough, and readily enforced
by prosecutors exercising their role as ministers of justice.12 Others identified
features of Brady that diluted its effectiveness.13 However disparate these voices are
in assessing Brady, there is widespread agreement that the doctrine was designed to
burden the prosecutor. Left undertheorized is the consideration that Brady also
operated to benefit prosecutorial interests. To examine this possibility, it is beneficial
to step away from the current debates and to consider Brady’s origin story.
A. Brady at Birth, a Modest Proposition
Initially, Brady received a quiet reception. The legal community viewed the case
as a minor adjustment to existing rules of trial engagement. Bar journals referenced
Brady a few times, accompanied by an obligatory summation.14
For contrast, the legal ecosystem’s reaction to Gideon v. Wainwright, decided that
same year, filled bar journal pages.15 As the legal community absorbed a new
paradigm of practice under Gideon, any significance of Brady escaped notice. The
following year, Gideon often served as a publication’s centerpiece: “The Year of

11. The references to “Brady v. Maryland” begin to grow in the mid-1970s, and
exponentially in the early 2000s. See Timeline Graph, LEXISNEXIS, https://advance.lexis.com/
(searching “Brady v. Maryland”).
12. See, e.g., Kelly A. Zusman & Daniel Gillogly, Getting a Clue: How Materiality
Continues to Play a Critical Role in Guiding Prosecutors’ Discovery Obligations, 60 U.S.
ATT’Y BULL. 5, 13–20 (2012) (referring to some Brady disclosure requirements as “selfexecuting” and arguing that the broad view of materiality at the pretrial stage used by some
trial court judges “does not reflect the constitutional rule”).
13. See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text.
14. A search on Hein Online for “‘brady maryland’~4” calls up two bar journals in 1963;
the same search for Gideon resulted in seventy-seven references. In 1963–64, scholarship
addressing Brady only provided a quick, accessible summary of the holding. See, e.g., Carolyn
Jaffe Andrew, Abstracts of Recent Cases, 54 J. CRIM L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 488, 493
(1963); Notes, Contracts—Minor’s Contract—An Absolute or Relative Nullity?, 38 TUL. L.
REV. 755, 760–63 (1964); George Rossman & Rowland L. Young, Review of Recent Supreme
Court Decisions, 49 A.B.A. J. 895, 899 (1963). But c.f. Richard A. Bradshaw, Comment,
Discovery in Criminal Cases: The Problem in Texas, 1 HOUS. L. REV. 158, 162 nn.30–31
(1963); John C. Tyson, III, Whither: On Habeus, 24 ALA. LAW. 271 (1963).
15. Examples of Gideon’s uptake abound. In Missouri, “[L]eaders of the Bar [now]
realize that further progress must be made in providing counsel for indigents. Roy Swanson,
Report of President Roy P. Swanson, 19 J. MO. B., 592, 593–94 (1963); see also Edward
Thorton, Sections for the Alabama Bar Association, 24 ALA. LAW. 335, 336, 341 (1963). In
New York, Gideon is a “significant achievement.” Lawyers Guide to Current Thought as
Culled from the Periodicals, 21 B. BULL. N.Y. 146, 150 (1963). In North Carolina (where
state-rights adherents bristled at federal incursion), the state deputy attorney general wrote: “I
apologize to you for again mentioning this much discussed subject. Now that the Supreme
Court of the United States has begun its process of legislation . . . the next question is: What
is the probable extent of this Act now that it has passed?” Honorable Ralph Moody, Probable
Extent of Assignment of Counsel of Indigent Defendants, N.C. ST. B. Q., Nov. 1963, at 21, 22.
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Gideon,” announced the Kentucky State Bar Journal;16 “The Gideon Case, A
Mandate for the Organized Bar,” stated the Boston Bar Journal;17 “The Impact of
Gideon v. Wainwright,” announced the Pennsylvania Bar Association Magazine.18
Having a similar period of time to reflect over Brady’s potential import, the legal
community remained silent—though a bar journal did take up discussion on Brady
in 1964 for its possible contribution to understanding an arcane civil-procedure point
about the Erie Doctrine.19
The muted reaction was understandable. The opinion traveled well-tread
precedent, the majority viewing the decision as “an extension” of Mooney v.
Holohan.20 Decided in 1935, Mooney stood for the proposition that due process was
offended if a prosecutor presented trial testimony “known to be perjured.”21 Like
Mooney, Brady regulated the quality of information heard by a jury: if Mooney
governed what evidence could not be presented at trial (perjured evidence), Brady
governed what evidence had to be disclosed at trial (material and exculpatory
evidence).22 A few months after Brady, the Third Circuit granted a new trial where a
prosecutor withheld a witness statement that the murder victim had aggressed toward
defendant,23 and the Second Circuit ordered a new trial where the prosecutor failed
to disclose eyewitnesses who contradicted the State’s case.24 These cases reveal
Brady’s provision of a remedy where Mooney did not—at issue was not what the
prosecutor did disclose, but what information the prosecutor failed to disclose.
Highlighting Brady’s low profile, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1966 stated,
as to prosecutorial duties of disclosure, the “leading case is Mooney v. Holohan.”25
A broad review of cases in the five years following Brady’s arrival indicates Brady
did not disrupt business as usual.26

16. Arnold Trebach, The Year of Gideon, 28 KY. ST. B.J. 37 (1964).
17. Frederick Norton, The Gideon Case: A Mandate for the Organized Bar, 8 BOS. B.J. 7
(1964).
18. Richard Thornburg, Indigents in the Pennsylvania Criminal Courts: The Impact of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 36 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 59 (1964).
19. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964), reprinted in 19 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 64 (1964).
20. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
111–12 (1935)).
21. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 111–12. Mooney was not only modest in ambition but was in
operation unenforceable (even if one could prove a witness perjured himself, the prosecutor
could deny knowledge of the perjury).
22. Other cases are often cited on the path from Mooney to Brady: in Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213, 215–16 (1942), the Court suggested a due process violation if a prosecutor
suppressed evidence favorable to defendant, though the ruling was based on the State
presenting perjured testimony; in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), the Court held
that a prosecutor offends due process where he fails to correct false evidence.
23. United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1963).
24. United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1964).
25. Commonwealth v. Heffernan, 213 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Mass. 1966) (citation omitted).
26. Searches of Hein Online for “Brady v. Maryland” from 1963–73 reveal few mentions
of the case in bar journals (forty-five) or American Bar Association journals (twenty-one).
Many of the mentions were syllabi of the case, informing readers of the facts, issue, and
outcome. See, e.g., Rossman & Young, supra note 14. Several more relate to antitrust
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The early consensus among federal and state courts was that trial triggered Brady
and that the constitutional regulation of information did not extend to the pretrial
period. One such decision even held a prosecutor need not consider a Brady
disclosure until the “government has closed its case in chief.”27 Courts deemed the
pretrial space off limits to defendants who attempted to use Brady as a pretrial
discovery right.28 On this point, a district court in United States v. Manhattan Brush
Co. was emphatic, a subheading in its order stating, “The Principles of Fair Play in
the Conduct of a Criminal Prosecution Do Not Supply Defendants with a Basis for
Pre-Trial Discovery.”29 The court continued that the defendant’s position was
“predicated on the alleged right of the defense to learn all the Government’s evidence
in advance of trial. . . . [But in Brady] [t]he entire discussion of the Court related to
the resulting deception upon the Court and jury.”30 The court observed that pretrial
discovery was governed by legislative rules, not court-superintended constitutional
review.31 Similarly, an Alabama decision declining to provide relief under Brady
referred the defendant to the state’s legislative rules for guidance on pretrial
discovery rights.32 In Iowa, a defendant’s assertion that Brady entitled him to pretrial
depositions, so as to permit effective cross-examination at trial, was rejected as an
attempt to transform Brady into a “right of discovery.”33 A Floridian defendant
attempting to deploy Brady as a tool to compel pretrial discovery was similarly
rejected.34 A Wisconsin court, rejecting a Brady claim, added that any pretrial right
to information would need to be found in state law, since Wisconsin “[did] not
recognize a right in defendant to a pretrial discovery of the prosecution’s evidence.”35
The Missouri Supreme Court, in 1967, found nothing in Brady to permit a defendant
“prior to trial to inspect all evidence in the hands of the prosecution favorable to the
accused.”36

litigation. See, e.g., Charles D. Mahaffie, Jr., Criminal Antitrust Investigations, 41 ANTITRUST
L.J. 521, 521–26 (1971). In the five years post-Brady, only forty-five federal cases and sixtyfive state cases mention Brady v. Maryland. The references to Brady begin to grow in the mid1970s, and exponentially in the early 2000s. See supra note 11.
27. United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
28. E.g., United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 5–6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Sanders v. State, 179 So. 2d 35, 39 (Ala. 1965) (stating that Brady provides no authority for
defendant to engage in a “mere fishing expedition”).
29. Manhattan Brush, 38 F.R.D. at 5–6.
30. Id. at 6.
31. See id. at 6–7.
32. Sanders, 179 So. 2d at 38–39 (citing L. Drew Redden, The Right of the Defendant to
Discovery in Criminal Prosecutions, 22 ALA. LAW. 115 (1961)).
33. State v. Tharp, 138 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Iowa 1965).
34. United States v. Venn, 41 F.R.D. 540, 541 (S.D. Fla. 1966). The Floridian defendant
attempted to avoid reciprocity (in requesting information, a defendant waives any objection to
similar information requested by the State) by attempting to use Brady to effectuate a right of
discovery (presumably without triggering a reciprocity obligation). The court not only viewed
Brady as “advisory” but also stated that Brady does “not provide additional discovery.”
35. State v. Miller, 151 N.W.2d 157, 169 (Wis. 1967).
36. State v. Reynolds, 422 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. 1967) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
James M. Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D. 87, 87 (1964)).
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During those first years of Brady’s quiet arrival, courts understood Brady to
provide a modest gap-filling amendment to Mooney—where Mooney barred the
disclosure of certain evidence by the prosecutor, Brady announced what evidence a
prosecutor could not withhold at trial. 37 Attempts by defendants to expand Brady to
the pretrial phase were broadly rejected by state and federal courts. Understood as
imposing a modest burden on the prosecutor, no court or commentator considered
whether the decision to cede the pretrial process to legislative regulation constituted
a significant realignment of power that favored prosecutorial interests.
B. Brady in a Broader Context, a Momentous Impact
Brady was not decided in a procedural vacuum. In the interim between Mooney
and Brady, litigation in the United States had been transformed by legislative reform.
The Court in Brady, however, did not acknowledge the dramatic procedural
realignment that afforded pretrial information to civil defendants, but not to criminal
defendants. This Article contends Brady legitimated this new order. Under this view,
what was understood as a modest adjustment to existing doctrine had implicitly
validated sweeping legislative reform that granted pretrial discovery to civil
defendants but denied it to criminal defendants.
1. The Transformation of Litigation After Mooney
When the Court decided Mooney in 1935, civil and criminal parties were subject
to similar treatment.38 Governed by the common law, civil and criminal disputes
occurred in two stages: pleading and trial.39 Criminal and civil claimants typically
were constrained to presenting a single issue against a single defendant.40 Pleading

37. Outlier courts detected (however mistakenly) change afoot. E.g., United States v.
Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“It seems doubtful, however, that there
should be a blanket rule postponing to the trial all [Brady] disclosures . . . .”). A district court
in Indiana, in 1967, noted interplay between the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Jencks Act, and Brady, opining that the “Supreme Court today favors broader disclosure in
criminal cases.” United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419, 424 (S.D. Ind. 1967). And
yet, this court found no basis to grant defendant access to a list of government witnesses,
including eyewitnesses who could not identify defendants. Id. at 427.
38. Criminal litigants, for example, would seek instruction from a civil treatise, and vice
versa. Meyn, supra note 6, at 701–02.
39. Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 KAN. L. REV. 350–
52 (2002); see also JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW
PLEADING 13–14 (1969); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 8–9
(3d ed. 1923). The pleadings stage determined whether a plaintiff had a cognizable claim and,
if so, endeavored to precisely identify the dispute’s legal and factual topography. See id. at 9;
Charles E. Clark, History, Systems, and Functions of Pleading, 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 716, 717
(1926).
40. See, e.g., Stubblefield v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W. 444, 445 (Ky. 1923) (noting that
the particularities of pleading in criminal law “emanated from the extreme technical exactness
of the common law with reference to pleading in both civil and criminal causes”); 1 J AMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 508 (1883); Franklin G.
Fessenden, Improvement in Criminal Pleading, 10 HARV. L. REV. 98, 99 (1896) (“As in ancient
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was a technically demanding phase, but if litigants made it past judicial scrutiny of
the claim and defense, they advanced directly to trial. No process empowered parties
to develop and interrogate a pretrial record. Mooney precluded the prosecutor from
knowingly presenting perjured evidence at trial,41 as that was when, under commonlaw procedure, information was disclosed, developed, and interrogated.
After Mooney, however, legislative reform transformed litigation. Due to the
“extreme technical exactness” of pleading in “both civil and criminal causes,”42
common-law procedure drew criticism from all litigants.43 Within this criticism, the
New Deal ethos of centralized, expert-based policy interventions provided impetus
for federal reform.44 Congress enabled the Supreme Court to create the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.45 In creating a new approach to litigation, a civil rules advisory
committee (appointed by the Court) eased pleading requirements, permitted joinder
of claims and parties, and installed a pretrial discovery phase—this last part a
centerpiece, critical to the determination of cases on their merits.46 Civil reform
balanced competing interests by giving plaintiffs easy access to the courts while
giving defendants the pretrial opportunity to check the factual integrity of plaintiffs’
allegations. Many states adopted the federal template as their own.47
Following a broadly positive reception, federal reformers took up criminal
litigation with a proposal that mirrored the civil template.48 Under this proposal, a

days the test was whether the case could be brought to fit the writ, so now the inquiry . . . is
whether the case fits the form of indictment.”). As to single-issue pleading, see Tomlinson v.
Territory, 33 P. 950, 952 (N.M. 1893) (“There being but one count in the indictment, not more
than one offense could properly be proved. It is a principle of common law pleading, applicable
to both civil and criminal cases, that all pleadings must be single.”); THEODORE F. T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 424, 426 (5th ed. 1956) (describing
pleading requirements as to criminal disputes); Ronald Hamowy, F.A. Hayek and the Common
Law, 23 CATO J. 241, 248, (2003) (describing pleading requirements as to civil disputes);
Subrin, supra note 4, at 915. As to the reference to “litigants”—until the professionalization of
police and the rise of public prosecutors in the late 1800s, it was most common for a private
citizen to serve as a plaintiff in the criminal law actions. See PLUCKNETT, supra, at 424.
41. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1935).
42. Stubblefield, 246 S.W. at 445.
43. Meyn, supra note 6, at 701–03.
44. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 n.2 (2011);
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 270, 272–73 (1989); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1997).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 723(b)–(c) (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018)); Charles
E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551,
555–56 (1939). The Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
consisting of lawyers, academics, and judges to draft a proposal. Meyn, supra note 6, at 705;
Subrin, supra note 4, at 971–72.
46. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 976–82.
47. See Jerold H. Israel, On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 484–85 (1982).
48. Meyn, supra note 6, at 707–10. This approach had academic and political support. Id.
at 709–10. For example, Jerome Hall, a preeminent criminal procedure scholar, commented:
“[T]he new civil rules are always suggestive and sometimes can be applied almost literally to
criminal procedure.” Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51
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prosecutor could join issues and easily pass through the courthouse door, but in
exchange for this privilege, a defendant could require the prosecutor to immediately
turn over information relevant to the dispute, then test that information through
depositions. The full Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (“Criminal
Committee”), however, produced a significantly modified draft, keeping civiljoinder and notice-pleading rules but striking discovery provisions.49 As a result of
these changes, only one party to a criminal dispute has some degree of formalized
pretrial agency—the prosecutor, who receives information either through the grand
jury process (which affords the power to compel the disclosure of relevant
information) or from law enforcement (imbued with the authority to search and
seize). If civil reform created a finely tuned, hydraulic system intended to reach the
merits through adversarial testing, criminal reform worsened an already existing
asymmetry that favored prosecutors.50
This transformation of civil and criminal litigation occurred after the Court
decided Mooney but well before the Court decided Brady. When the Court decided
Brady in 1963, it looked across a transformed procedural plain. The new federal rules
of procedure had created two separate and unequal worlds—in the civil forum,
procedural reform constructed a pretrial discovery phase, but in the criminal forum,
it significantly expanded prosecutorial control over the pretrial period.
2. The Court in Brady Ignores the Procedural Transfer of Power to the Prosecutor
The Court ignored these transformative changes when it decided Brady. The
Court instead looked to Mooney—a case that superintended constitutional notions of
due process in a world that no longer existed. Following Mooney, the Court
announced that due process imposed certain obligations on the State at trial. Justice
White, in Brady’s concurrence, was the most explicit about the line of demarcation,
writing that the Court left pretrial discovery obligations to the “legislative process
after full consideration by legislators, bench, and bar.”51 What Justice White failed
to mention was that many legislatures across the country had already given full

YALE L.J. 723, 739 (1942).
49. See Meyn, supra note 6, at 727–30. The Committee preserved notice pleading and
expanded joinder, but discarded discovery, noticed motions, and pretrial influence of courts.
Id.
50. Police power has expanded in terms of staffing, resources, and investigative scope,
channeling more information to the State’s file. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 396 (1992). These conditions reinforce police and prosecutorial power.
Id. Prosecutors have long used the grand jury as an investigative tool. See, e.g., Abraham S.
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE
L.J. 1149, 1191 (1960).
51. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 92 (1963) (White, J., concurring). A few scholars
shared Justice White’s worry that the case would justify unwarranted judicial intervention. See,
e.g., Robinson O. Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases—In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE
L.J. 477, 515–16 (“For purposes of . . . [a Brady] petition, the defendant . . . will probably make
allegations in very broad terms . . . and then seek discovery of the documents which were not
exhibited to the defense . . . .”); David B. Wexler, The Constitutional Disclosure Duty and the
Jencks Act, 40 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 206, 211 (1966) (stating that Brady represents a
“constitutional discovery ambit”).
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consideration to these issues in establishing separate and unequal civil and criminal
forums, giving form to a new procedural structure that conferred significant benefits
to prosecutors.
3. Prosecutorial Power Expands After Brady
After the Court announced Brady in 1963, a second, more sustained legislative
period occurred that further increased prosecutorial pretrial discretion. During the
tough-on-crime movement in the 1970s, the prosecutorial hammer became heavier
and the radius of its sweep grew wider.52 The Court opted to take on spectator status,
staying true to the approach first fashioned in 1935 in Mooney, an approach of
judicial restraint that became more radical as the world around the Court continued
to change.
The legislative changes that occurred after Brady were substantive in nature but
exacerbated the procedural pretrial asymmetry existing between the criminal
defendant and the prosecutor. These changes are well documented. The 1970s
marked a hard turn toward crime control, along with a “revolutionary expansion . . .
in criminal discovery by the prosecution against the defense.”53 As the scope of
criminally regulated conduct increased,54 more severe sentencing regimes
proliferated.55 These conditions increased the prosecutor’s “charge bargaining”
discretion, in which she chooses from a menu of penalties for the same conduct,56 as
well as her “fact bargaining” discretion, in which a prosecutor determines what facts
to credit or disregard, providing penalty swings for the same conduct.57 The
widespread implementation of mandatory minimums—including the Federal

52. Ion Meyn, The Haves of Procedure, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1765, 1798–99 (2019).
53. Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1986) (emphasis added). Any discovery gains by defendants in
the 1960s would encounter a vigorous, sustained, counterresponse. See Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution’s
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 253 n.44 (1987); Meyn, supra
note 52, at 1798–1800; Ellen S. Podger, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements:
Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 662 nn.71–75 (1999).
54. Gershman, supra note 50, at 406 (surveying expansion of the substantive criminal
law).
55. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 58–61 (2007) (charting
proliferation of severe sentencing regimes in 1980s and 1990s); Avlana K. Eisenberg,
Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 81–82 (2016)
(describing effect of tough-on-crime rhetoric that emerged in the 1970s); Carissa Byrne
Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 169–
70 (2016) (describing how rehabilitation was replaced by retribution in the second half of the
20th century).
56. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 55–59 (1997).
57. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2559–60 (2004). Fact bargaining is seen in Bordenkircher v. Hayes: the
prosecutor threatened to credit a repeat-offender enhancement, transforming a sentence for
forgery from ten years to life. 434 U.S. 357, 358–59 (1978).
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Sentencing Guidelines in 1984—transferred discretion from the judiciary to the
prosecutor, further marginalizing the role of courts in criminal litigation.58 The
prosecutor’s control over the plea process grew as judges were prevented from
making downward departures, converting a prosecutor’s presentence offer into the
sentence itself.59 As reforms in the early 1940s removed the trial court from the front
end of litigation (it no longer served as a gatekeeper during the pleading stage),
legislative change after the 1970s removed the judge from the back end of litigation
(sentencing no longer served as a check on prosecutorial overreaching).
The Court remained on the sidelines, and the Brady doctrine remained anchored
to its noninterventionist origins. The Court rebuffed challenges to the trial/pretrial
line that constrained the scope of its due process review, holding fast to the
proposition that the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation is triggered by the onset of
trial.60 The Court has rejected arguments that pretrial proceedings are inextricable
from the quality of a trial or that a certain indicia of information should inform the
decision to plea.61 Providing insight into the justification for its commitment to
nonintervention, in United States v. Bagley, the Court explained its approach was
careful “not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is
uncovered.”62 But the Court was more explicit in United States v. Agurs, stating,
“[w]e are not considering the scope of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, or the wisdom of amending those Rules to enlarge the
defendant’s discovery rights.”63 Only Justice Marshall, in dissent, has challenged the
pretrial/trial boundary, stating in Bagley that courts gave “too much deference to the
federal common law policy of discouraging discovery in criminal cases, and too little
regard to due process of law for defendants.”64 After Marshall’s dissent in Bagley,

58. For a discussion of the origins of mandatory minimums, see Stephanos Bibas,
Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 936 (2006)
(“Liberals worried about racial and class disparities . . . conservatives inveighed against lenient
sentences by soft-on-crime judges.”). For accounts of judges criticizing loss of discretion due
to mandatory minimums, see United States v. Gregg, 435 F. App’x 209, 217–22 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Davis, J., concurring); Alan Abrahamson, Judicial Panel Seeks Repeal of Mandatory Sentence
Law, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1990), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-29-me675-story.html [https://perma.cc/M4JP-Z93Z]; Michael A. Ponsor, The Prisoners I Lose Sleep
Over, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-prisoners-i-lose-sleepoverthe-prisoners-i-lose-sleep-over-1392240190 [https://perma.cc/3NL4-K4FR].
59. Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 856 (2018) (finding that eliminating mandatory
sentences and narrowing overbroad laws would dramatically reduce prosecutorial leverage).
60. Sundby, supra note 15, at 643 (“[T]he courts have understood Brady as not requiring
disclosure until the trial itself, unless the failure to disclose earlier rendered the trial unfair.”).
61. None of the Court’s majority opinions deviate from the following principles: (1) Brady
is a trial right; (2) Brady is a prosecutorial obligation; and (3) Brady requires disclosure of
material evidence favorable to defendant.
62. 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
63. 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
64. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 702 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Oxman,
740 F.2d 1298, 1310–11 (3d Cir. 1984)). See Sundby, supra note 15, at 661 (“By the time of
Bagley, he had come to believe that a prosecutor should have to ‘turn over to the defendant,
all information known to the government that might reasonably be considered favorable to the
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no justice would seriously propose to move the pretrial/trial boundary line. In this
sense, the Court’s more recent holding in United States v. Ruiz—proclaiming a
prosecutor’s Brady obligation is waived in the event of a pretrial plea—was a die
already cast.65 In 1977, the Court had already confirmed that the prosecutor’s due
process duty is limited to ensuring “trials are fair,” that Brady information is essential
to “trial preparation,” and that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery
in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.”66 The Court in Ruiz remained true
to the boundary lines that the Court has articulated since deciding Mooney in 1935.67
The Court’s remaining role has been reduced to calling balls or strikes on the issue
of whether the prosecutor, at trial, disclosed information that was material to the
defendant—determining whether consideration of withheld information would have
led to a “reasonable probability” of a different result.68 Smith v. Cain is the nadir of
this development: Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas disagree over whether the
suppressed information would have reasonably led to a different outcome—two
lawyers having the final argument over the meaning of the same factual record.69
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Kyles v. Whitley was prescient in this sense:
In a sensible system of criminal justice, wrongful conviction is avoided
by establishing, at the trial level, lines of procedural legality that leave
ample margins of safety (for example, the requirement that guilt be

defendant’s case.’”). In Moore v. Illinois, Justice Marshall, in dissent, had earlier sought to
expand the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation to information that is “clearly relevant.” 408 U.S.
786, 809 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Unthreatened by
Marshall’s dissent, the majority brushed off his proposal, remarking that there was “no
constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the
defense of all police investigatory work on a case.” Id. at 795 (majority opinion).
65. See 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution does not require the Government
to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal
defendant.”). In Bagley, the Court rejected any distinction between impeachment evidence and
exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; see also United States v. Meregildo, 920 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“While discovery is a pretrial mechanism for defendants
to secure information to marshal their defense, Brady and its progeny are concerned with
determining whether withheld information was material to the outcome of a trial.”); Miriam
H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015) (explaining how the late trigger for Brady
material further dilutes its effectiveness).
66. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977), reaff’d, United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
67. Under Ruiz, it does not offend due process to force a defendant to determine whether
to advance to trial without the benefit of assessing information in the State’s possession that
would lead to acquittal. Ruiz thus permits a prosecutor to misrepresent the strength of her case
by omission. Should the prosecutor successfully secure a plea by bluff, Ruiz rewards the
misrepresentation by immunizing her from a Brady claim. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
68. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The Court expanded the scope of “material” in Kyles v.
Whitley to explicitly make the prosecutor responsible for eligible evidence in police files. 514
U.S. 419 (1995). Brady may be triggered for failure to disclose evidence of the following:
impeachment, Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012); a flawed investigation or an alternative
suspect, Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445; incentivized testimony, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154 (1972); and an alibi, State v. Larimore, 17 S.W.3d 87, 91–92 (Ark. 2000).
69. See Smith, 565 U.S. at 73.
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt)—not by providing recurrent and
repetitive appellate review of whether the facts in the record show those
lines to have been narrowly crossed.70
Embedded in Justice Scalia’s frustration is a broader observation that the Court has
long held in abeyance any significant change to its due process jurisprudence
governing the distribution of information in criminal disputes. As litigation continues
to change, the Court’s decision to hold the line and cede the assessment of due
process during the pretrial phases to other branches begins to look less like judicial
restraint and more like an act of judicial abdication.
II. BRADY, ASSESSING THE BENEFITS TO THE PROSECUTOR
Brady has been understood as a burden on the prosecutor and a benefit to the
defendant. This is doctrinally correct, as the holding of the case imposes an
affirmative obligation on the prosecutor and constrains prosecutorial discretion.
Brady’s obligation even incentivizes some prosecutorial offices to conduct thorough
pretrial reviews of law enforcement files and to make disclosures during the pretrial
period.71 Scholarship, meanwhile, has thoroughly vetted Brady’s doctrinal treatment,
providing insights into how Brady’s promise has been diminished and proposing
ways in which the doctrine might be more effectively enforced or replaced
altogether.72
The questions of whether and how Brady confers benefits to prosecutors,
however, remains unaddressed. This Article approaches this question by examining
both some structural, narrative, and political implications of Brady and the resulting
benefits that potentially accrue to the prosecutor. Structurally, Brady can be
understood to have validated the reform’s transformation of litigation that
empowered civil defendants with pretrial discovery rights but deprived criminal
defendants of the same. The structural component of this Article’s approach builds
on other scholars’ contributions, such as Scott Sundry’s and Eugene Cerruti’s
criticisms about the absence of Brady’s pretrial presence within the procedural
realities of criminal litigation, and Jennifer Laurin’s insights about the Court’s
deference to executive actors in the pretrial space.73 The main benefit of Brady’s
structural impact was that the case constitutionally legitimized a prosecutor’s pretrial

70. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. As to jurisdictions that attempt to comply with a prosecutor’s Brady obligation by
instituting an open-file policy, doing so is often underinclusive—Brady requires a prosecutor
to review more than her file, but also law enforcement files—and overinclusive, as Brady
requires no disclosure of information that is merely relevant to the case. See Section I.A.
72. See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text.
73. Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New
Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 KY. L.J. 211, 214 (2005)
(Brady is now a rule that both encourages and shields pretrial nondisclosure by the prosecutor);
Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial Criminal
Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 789–90, 794–97 (2014); Sundby, supra note 15, at
643 (“Once Brady’s development as a constitutional law doctrine is coupled with the realities
of criminal practice, it should not be surprising that Brady has not generated a large amount
of pre-trial discovery.”).
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control over information. Narratively, popular accounts surrounding Brady inflate
the doctrine’s impact, scope, and reach. The main benefit of Brady’s narrative impact
is its legitimization of case outcomes.74 Politically, prosecutors have used Brady to
defeat legislative efforts to expand pretrial discovery. The main benefit of Brady’s
political impact is its prestige; what the doctrine demands acts as the reference point
from which arguments to expand pretrial disclosures must contend.
A. Structural Benefits: The Constitutional Validation of Pretrial Power
When Mooney was decided, the Court’s due process approach reflected the
underlying dynamics of litigation: it was during trial when information was
developed and interrogated by parties. In deciding Brady, the Court would influence
what process was due within a new world of litigation that understood pretrial
discovery’s power to shape litigation outcomes. But where civil procedure provided
for pretrial discovery, criminal litigation did not. Did this dramatic disparity comport
with due process where trial no longer functioned, at least in civil disputes, as the
engine of factual contestation? With the creation of a system that provided for much
more robust development of pretrial information to civil litigants, did an adjacent
system that provided for virtually no pretrial information to criminal litigants
comport with due process? The Court answered the question without commenting on
it by announcing that the prosecutor’s affirmative obligation to turn over information
under the Constitution did not mature until trial.75 In doing so, the Court implicitly
legitimated a pretrial regime that deprived criminal defendants of information, even
as civil defendants were afforded powerful pretrial discovery tools.
The timing of Brady’s disclosure requirement—triggered by trial—is not the only
factor to consider in understanding Brady’s validation of two separate and unequal
systems of litigation. Brady also defined what information was constitutionally
required in criminal litigation. And it is certainly not the broad sweep of relevant,
inadmissible information that characterizes civil discovery entitlements. Instead,
Brady requires that a prosecutor turn over admissible evidence if it effectively
constitutes a “smoking gun” that favors a defendant. If due process only requires
disclosure of this narrowly defined category of information at trial, what information
could possibly be constitutionally required during the pretrial phase? Certainly
nothing more than what is triggered by trial, and yet, it is not possible to conceive of
a narrower category of information than “material and exculpatory.”76
Brady thus constructed a wall; on one side of the wall was trial, where a prosecutor
had to turn over a narrow category of information, and on the other side of the wall
was a vast pretrial territory, where virtually all disputes resolve and where due

74. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 15, at 643–44 (“Brady is often heralded as the Supreme
Court case that granted the criminally accused a constitutional right to discovery . . . . Certainly
when I first started teaching Brady, I taught it from this heroic viewpoint.”).
75. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
76. Sundby, supra note 15, at 651 (“This piece of evidence is so exculpatory in nature
that it actually undermines my belief that a guilty verdict would be worthy of confidence.
Under Brady, therefore, I need to turn this evidence over to the defense. Then, once I turn the
evidence over and satisfy my constitutional obligation, I can resume my zealous efforts to
obtain a guilty verdict that I have just concluded will not be worthy of confidence.”).
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process is never offended when a prosecutor withholds information from a
defendant.77 The doctrine is not framed in its inverse, but to do so leaves a sense that
something is amiss: Brady also stands for the proposition that it does not offend due
process for a prosecutor to withhold any and all information from a defendant during
the pretrial phase.78 In proposing a minor adjustment in due process doctrine under
the guise of judicial restraint, Brady might be reframed as a moment in which the
Court left a defendant equally vulnerable to the political process and prosecutorial
influence.
How can Brady’s benefit to prosecutors be fully understood? The Court implicitly
brokered a compromise that imposed limited obligations on the prosecutor at trial
but signaled to prosecutors that due process concerns did not apply before trial.
Virtually all cases resolve during the pretrial period; thus, in terms of case volume,
the prosecutor is statistically the chief beneficiary of Brady’s constitutional
compromise. The prosecutor is also particularly well positioned to benefit from
Brady’s facilitation of prosecutorial discretion as to the distribution of pretrial
information. The State, through its exercise of state power, typically has superior
resources, better access to critical case information, and the privilege to be that
information’s interpreter.79 The Brady compromise already amplifies this
information and resource asymmetry by giving the prosecutor constitutional
clearance to withhold information that is not material and exculpatory. But the Brady
compromise also leaves defendants more vulnerable to these dynamics in denying
them any due process right to test any information before trial. Examples abound: A
defendant has no constitutional right to propound document requests for investigative
material essential to a “failure to investigate” defense. A defendant has no
constitutional right to depose law enforcement officers, insulating officers from
impeachment opportunities at trial. A defendant has no right to depose eyewitnesses,
leaving the witness’s motivations a blank slate and foregoing an opportunity to
develop sophisticated expert testimony that is only possible through a detailed,
pretrial, accounting of the incident. These type of pretrial opportunities (common
place to civil litigation) obviously and profoundly shape not only settlement but also
any trial. Under a robust pretrial discovery regime, the trial is no longer the singular
moment of adversarial testing but is part of an information-gathering, informationtesting adversarial continuum. In civil litigation, there is just no debate over whether
the quality of a trial is dependent on the quality of pretrial discovery. As to anyone
embedded in the criminal system who might adhere to the magical thinking that trialby-surprise provides an adequate adversarial forum,80 Brady does much of the work
to legitimate this specious assertion.

77. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
78. Ristroph, supra note 9.
79. Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2014); see also Laurin, supra note 73, at 797.
80. The Supreme Court contributes to this magical thinking. As Jennifer Laurin astutely
observes, the Court has construed police officers, for example, to be technocrats that should
be trusted to rely on their own “certification and training regimes,” because police have a
“strong incentive” not to waste limited time and resources. Laurin, supra note 73, at 815–16.
For the Court to adopt this perspective is to ignore empirical and qualitative data that reveal
systemic conduct and cultural features that contradict the Court’s depiction. See, e.g.,
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It is difficult to construe Brady’s subsilencio compromise—imposing a narrow
disclosure obligation on the prosecutor in exchange for constitutional permission to
refrain from disclosing pretrial information—as an oversight by the Court. As the
Court considered Brady, it looked upon an unprecedented procedural experiment that
the Court itself had superintended. The Court was also aware that the Criminal
Committee, appointed by the Chief Justice, was controlled by prosecutors. By the
time that the Court had considered Brady, two pretrial systems, disparate and unequal
in their distribution of information, were defining features of the litigation landscape.
And where civil litigation’s pretrial experiment was celebrated by the legal
community during this time, judicial and academic voices were increasingly
criticizing the comparative disadvantage that the criminal pretrial period visited on
defendants.81 In announcing that constitutional review would be limited to trial,
Brady nevertheless signaled that any challenge to the sufficiency of the pretrial
record would fall outside constitutional review. In this way, Brady had a “powerconferring” aspect; that is, in creating a zone of regulation, the Court facilitated the
exercise of state power not only in the trial phase (permitting the prosecutor to
withhold exculpatory evidence that is merely relevant) but also during the pretrial
phase (permitting the prosecutor, as a constitutional matter, to withhold any and all
information from the defendant during the pretrial phase).82
Under this view, Brady is also situated within what Jennifer Laurin observes as a
“structure of American criminal procedure doctrine” that “approaches the pretrial
realm with a comparatively light regulatory touch.”83 Brady, in reserving a large
swath of territory free from constitutional review, was reflective of a judicial
commitment to “broad [prosecutorial] pretrial discretion as an embedded feature of
criminal procedure doctrine.”84 In restricting due process review of the record at trial,
the Court favored the institutional preferences of the prosecutors that the court not
intervene in pretrial matters and that any perceived overstepping be addressed
internally by the prosecutor’s office.85 Laurin observed that courts have been a
willing partner in this arrangement:
[I]n regard to the prosecutorial role, the Court has repeatedly advanced a
conception of the prosecutorial function as being meaningfully overseen

COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTICORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION REPORT
1994, 36–37 (1994) (reporting significant level of officers falsifying reports and committing
perjury); INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, at ix-xiv (1991) (reporting
widespread police misconduct).
81. See infra Section II.C.1.
82. Ristroph, supra note 9.
83. Laurin, supra note 73, at 785 (“Notwithstanding efforts by the Warren Court . . .
criminal procedure doctrine protects against little other than deliberate law enforcement
overreach in the course of an investigation . . . .”).
84. Id. at 799.
85. There are multiple instances in which members of the advisory committee pushed back
against proposed rules in criminal litigation that interfered with prosecutorial intentions—even
the idea that a court could set a status conference or control the court calendar was deemed too
invasive. See Meyn, supra note 6, at 717–20.
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through a professionally inculcated justice-seeking orientation,
mechanisms of internal, administrative regulation that guide
prosecutorial discretion, and viable claims to comparative expertise with
regard to review, charging, and even (in the context of pleas) case
disposition.86
This institutional agreement is self-reinforcing. The judiciary cedes territory to the
prosecutor based on the presumption that a prosecutor inhabits a special role as a
minister of justice, a role conception that in turn legitimizes the abdication of judicial
oversight.87
By circumscribing the affirmative disclosure obligation of the prosecutor, Brady
communicated to criminal justice stakeholders that the distribution and interrogation
of information during the pretrial period was not subject to constitutional review, and
thereby conferred constitutional legitimacy to the redesign of litigation. In this way,
the Court’s modest Brady doctrine might be understood as much more sweeping in
scope and purpose. Viewed as a line-drawing compromise that facilitates the exercise
of state power during the pretrial period, when most cases resolve, Brady can be
viewed as a decision that distributed significant benefits to prosecutorial interests.
B. Narrative Benefits: Legitimizing the Prosecutor’s Role
A pervasive narrative portrays Brady as imposing a significant burden on the
prosecutor. Law students are often left with the impression that Brady established a
special burden on the prosecutor to act against her own interests in service of our
commitment to due process. Prosecutors portray Brady as a cross to be borne; that
is, disclosing information damaging to their own case is essential to a full accounting
of the factual record and a just result. Court opinions, media accounts, as well as
postconviction briefs filed by defendants will portray Brady’s prosecutorial burden
as significant. As scholars push back on these conceptions of Brady, the burdenembellishment narrative continues to persist, and in doing so, provides benefits to
the prosecutor: the narrative of a burdened prosecutor adds legitimacy to the
prosecutorial role (to be burdened is to act responsibly) and reinforces the rightness
of outcomes (to have satisfied a special disclosure obligation is to have ensured that
a defendant had sufficient information in which to advance a defense).
In law school, casebooks that introduce students to core concepts must cover
impressive territory—in criminal procedure, for example, this includes gaining an
understanding of rights and remedies surrounding investigations, pretrial
proceedings, trial, sentencing, and appeal. Given the breadth of treatment, emphasis
in these survey courses is by necessity doctrinal. For this reason, Brady is often
construed as the judiciary might express its purpose; that is, Brady burdens the
prosecutor and benefits the defendant. A representative casebook asserts a
“Defendant’s Right to Discover the State’s Case” with the subtitle: “The classic right
of a defendant to discover the state’s case comes from Brady v. Maryland.”88 Another

86. Laurin, supra note 73, at 789–90.
87. See id. at 810.
88. ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 1239
(3d ed. 2010). But see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (stating prosecutor’s

2020]

FLI P P I NG TH E S CRIP T O N B RA DY

901

coursebook, consistent with the account that the Warren Court’s jurisprudence had
effects beyond national borders, observes, “The Court’s first constitutional discovery
case was a ‘shot heard ‘round the world.’”89 Another account highlights the case’s
constitutional supremacy over statewide legal regulation: “Brady’s due process
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence overrides any limitations on discovery
provided for by a jurisdiction’s discovery statutes or rules.”90
Reflecting the influence of a curricular approach that focuses on doctrine, the
prosecutorial-burden narrative readily finds traction in student articles.91 “By
recognizing that basic fairness and the integrity of the criminal process were at
stake,” wrote a future clerk for the Supreme Court, “Brady departed from the view
of criminal trials as purely adversarial contests. The Brady rule rests on the notion
that a criminal trial is a search for the truth.”92 “Brady placed new, significant
disclosure requirements on the prosecution.”93 “Brady v. Maryland is a landmark
holding . . . to expand the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure.”94 “Because the

duty in Brady is limited to ensuring that “trials are fair”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
109 (1976) (“If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a
prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete discovery of his
files as a matter of routine practice. Whether or not procedural rules authorizing such broad
discovery might be desirable, the Constitution surely does not demand that much.”); Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (“Although the Due Process Clause has little to say
regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded, it does speak to the
balance of forces between the accused and his accuser.”).
89. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 2, at 892. But see scholarship of comparativists who
note that the “level of nondisclosure” Brady tolerates “would not be tolerated [by] public
prosecutors in virtually any other mature system of law.” Cerruti, supra note 73, at 214.
90. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 888. Arguably absent from this account is an example
of Brady overriding state legislation; to conflict with Brady, a state law would have to require
a prosecutor to withhold exculpatory information at trial. Such a statute presumably has never
existed.
91. Law students have identified cause to criticize Brady, but the case is still understood
to burden prosecutors. See, e.g., James M. Grossman, Note, Getting Brady Right: Why
Extending Brady v. Maryland’s Trial Right to Plea Negotiations Better Protects a Defendant’s
Constitutional Rights in the Modern Legal Era, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1525, 1526 (finding, “[i]n
today’s criminal justice system, where pleas and plea bargaining are the norm, Brady’s promise
to defendants rings hollow,” and yet stating, “Brady is a clear and powerful asset for
defendants”).
92. Robert Hochman, Note, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal
Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1673–74 (1996). This Note reflects a common sentiment about
Brady—that disclosure itself is incompatible with adversarialism. Yet it seems that civil
pretrial proceedings are adversarial even as they require disclosure. Interestingly, one of the
most influential writers on procedural reform, George Ragland, thought that regimes providing
for partial disclosures undermine the truth. GEORGE RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 251–
52 (1932) (noting “full and equal discovery” was the best “preventative of perjury,” whereas
“limited or unequal discovery” fostered “perjury, manufactured testimony, and kindred
evils.”).
93. Michael A. Jeter, Note, Criminal Law—The Right to an Impartial Trial Is Protected
by an Opportunity to Prove that Juror Bias or Prosecutorial Misconduct Affected the Outcome
of the Trial Smith v. Phillips, 26 HOW. L.J. 799, 808 (1983).
94. Blaise Niosi, Note, Architects of Justice: The Prosecutor’s Role and Resolving
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government has vastly superior investigative resources with which to discover
information . . . one of the most valuable rights that a criminal defendant enjoys is
his constitutional right to all evidence in the government’s possession that is material
either to his guilt or punishment.”95 These observations not only highlight the
impression soon-to-be lawyers will have of Brady’s burden but also illustrate the
powerful link between the narrative of prosecutorial burden and the legitimation of
criminal-law outcomes.
Courts also contribute to this narrative. The Supreme Court proclaimed Brady
“our seminal case on the disclosure of prosecutorial evidence.”96 The Court
maintains Brady is a “broad obligation” that is “illustrative” of “the special role
played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trial”;97
language that is oft cited in federal and state decisions.98 Courts portray Brady as
exceptional: “[T]he government’s Brady obligation [can be understood] in terms of
the special status of the American prosecutor.”99 Courts also tie Brady’s obligation
as a guarantee of legitimate outcomes: “Courts, litigants, and juries properly
anticipate that obligations to refrain from improper methods to secure a conviction
. . . will be faithfully observed.”100 The Seventh Circuit contends Brady imposes “a
special duty to ‘get it right.’”101 The implication: because of Brady, prosecutors get
it right.
The burden-embellishment narrative unsurprisingly receives prosecutorial buyin.102 For example, Boise Senior Deputy Prosecutor James Dickinson stated,
prosecutors “understand and accept the high ethical obligation” imposed by Brady.103
New York Assistant District Attorney Kristin Hamann wrote of Brady’s “everpresent” demands: the prosecutor is “charged with constructive knowledge of the

Whether Inadmissible Evidence Is Material Under the Brady Rule, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1499,
1307 (2014).
95. Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor’s Duty to Search the
Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1481–82 (2003).
96. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 473 (2009). This articulation approaches deception—
though the word “disclosure” is suggestive of a discovery right, the word “evidence” only
applies to trial.
97. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
98. See, e.g., Ross v. Pineda, 549 F. App’x 444 (6th Cir. 2013); Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d
998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013); Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2012); Villasana v.
Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Whitley, 940 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 72 (2nd. Cir. 1984); People v. Morris, 756 P.3d
843, 861 (Cal. 1988); People ex. rel. E.G., 368 P.3d 946, 949 (Colo. 2016); People v. Hayes,
950 N.E.2d 118, 120 (N.Y. 2011); Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648 (Pa. 2012); In re
Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 972 P.2d 1250, 1272 (Wash. 1999) (Sanders, J., dissenting).
99. Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Strickler, 527
U.S. 263).
100. Tuma v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d, 365, 379 n.10 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Banks
v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004)).
101. Fields, 672 F.3d at 514.
102. See Robert Don Gifford, Ethics and the Criminal Prosecutor: Guilt Shall Not Escape
nor Innocents Shall Suffer, 76 OKLA. B. J., 2845 (2005).
103. Jim Dickinson, Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Favorable Evidence, ADVOCATE, Jan.
2010, at 25.
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police investigation and constructive possession of police files,” even though the
prosecutor may not have “received the information from the police and does not
know it exists.”104 This account of a significant discovery burden would strike a civil
litigator as wanting. A civil litigator is expected to secure a much broader sweep of
information in each and every case, not just a narrow band of information in the
exceptional case that advances to trial.105 And while a prosecutor works with the
same players, civil litigators often manage the discovery obligations of multinational
corporate clients by responding to interrogatories, document production requests,
and depositions—all from which a prosecutor is excused. The typical account of
Brady’s burden, however, avoids such comparisons.
The prosecutorial-burden narrative can come from unlikely sources. Defense
attorneys contribute to the narrative; their position in litigation often demands
making this case. In postconviction motions seeking new trials, defense attorneys
will often introduce Brady in truth-seeking terms to describe a doctrine that requires
something significant of the prosecutor, a strategically sound approach to push
against Brady’s doctrinal margins in the hope of receiving postconviction table
scraps.106 It may also be surprising that progressive media outlets will contribute to
a popular understanding that Brady imposes a heavy burden on the prosecutor.
Andrew Cohen at The Atlantic wrote that the Supreme Court used Brady as “a vehicle
to memorialize a constitutional rule that burdened prosecutors with an affirmative
duty to share with criminal defendants evidence that by its very definition would
undermine the prosecution’s case.”107 Linda Greenhouse included Brady among the
key cases representing the “Warren Court’s progressive constitutional revolution at
the peak of its energy and transformative power,” signaling that Brady contributed
to significant, prodefendant, change.108 Radley Balko in The Huffington Post wrote,
“The Brady decision was really about establishing fundamental fairness in the
criminal justice system and making trials a search for truth, rather than lawyering
competitions.”109

104. Kristin Hamann, Getting It Right: Practical Approaches to 21st Century Prosecution,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 3, 2013, at 2.
105. Sundby, supra note 15, at 659 (“[T]he fact that nine out of ten cases are resolved by
guilty pleas ensures that Brady plays a minimal role in triggering prosecutorial disclosure of
exculpatory evidence.”).
106. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1071, 1098 (2017) (noting low success rate of Brady claims); Stephanos Bibas, Brady v.
Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 144–45 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (noting low success rate of
Brady claims); Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 489
(2009) (contending a prosecutor can suppress information “knowing there is little chance the
evidence will ever come to light”).
107. Andrew Cohen, Prosecutors Shouldn’t Be Hiding Evidence from Defendants,
ATLANTIC (May 13, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/prosecutors
-shouldnt-be-hiding-evidence-from-defendants/275754/ [https://perma.cc/33DJ-WZ2K].
108. Linda Greenhouse, The Rigorous Romantic: Anthony Lewis on the Supreme Court
Beat, 79 MO. L. REV. 907, 907 (2014).
109. Radley Balko, Brady v. Maryland Turns 50, But Defense Attorneys Aren’t
Celebrating, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/13
/brady-v-maryland-50_n_3268000.html [https://perma.cc/HG86-KLQQ].
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Against these strong currents, scholarship has labored to move past this narrative.
For example, scholars have broadly critiqued Brady’s enforcement mechanisms: that
placing compliance in the hands of the prosecutor leads to underenforcement;110 that
the late timing of its disclosure obligation undermines a prosecutor’s ability to be
objective;111 and that obstacles particular to postconviction procedure undermine
efforts to prove up violations.112 In the course of identifying doctrinal flaws, some
frame the case as having had the promise to impose a significant burden on the
prosecutor.113 Some proposed alternative means—like open file policies—are

110. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs
Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391,
397 (1984) (arguing that the pretrial burden of determining the favorability of evidence should
be on an independent, objective fact finder of the trial court through an in camera review);
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny,
86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 463–64 (2001) (“Congress and state legislatures should pass legislation
establishing Prosecution Review Boards.”); Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming:
Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1088–
1105 (2009) (proposing a list to shame prosecutors who violate Brady); Jason Kreag, The
Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 47 (2014) (proposing a pretrial, on the record
colloquy in which a judge would question the prosecutor about her efforts to comply with
Brady); Medwed, supra note 3, at 1542 (proposing remedies to address “lapses of judgment
regarding prosecutor’s disclosure obligations”); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 731 (1987)
(contending that given evidence of “intentional Brady-type misconduct, the instances of
discipline are too rare” and arguing for a bad faith standard); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong
Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. Rev. 833, 870 (1997); Fred C. Zacharias, The
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 722 (2001) (noting “dearth of
cases in which disciplinary authorities have sanctioned prosecutors”).
111. Baer, supra note 65, 35–38 (observing that, as the eve of trial approaches, prosecutors
are less able to objectively review a case).
112. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 106, at 484; Justin Murray, Prejudiced-Based Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 302 (2020) (examining how the outcomedeterminative appellate review standard serves to dilute Brady’s burden); Eve Brensike
Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597, 606, 608 (2011) (finding
state procedure typically leaves defendants to bring postconviction Brady claims pro se); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It’s Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8
UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 275, 291 (“[P]rosecutors know that there is little, if any, remedy for
misconduct because the appellate standard of review is harmless error.”).
113. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The
Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 190 (1983) (noting that
Brady was the case that “promoted the system’s capacity to adjudicate guilt more reliably”);
Capra, supra note 110, at 392 (noting Brady “was a major step forward in equalizing access
to exculpatory evidence”); Davis, supra note 110, at 431 (noting that Brady was intended to
be “expansive” in its requirements); Harvey Gee, Chasing the Dragon: The Forgotten Story
of Wong Sun v. United States, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 159, 160 (2011) (reviewing CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE STORIES (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006)) (noting Brady is considered a consensus
candidate in the “Criminal Procedure Revolution” canon that “strengthened the constitutional
rights of individuals within the criminal justice system”); Bruce I. Kogan & Cheryl L.
Robertson, Chief Justice Joseph R. Weisberger’s Page of History, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 501, 525–26 (2001) (noting Brady as a “seminal decision” that “constitutionalized the

2020]

FLI P P I NG TH E S CRIP T O N B RA DY

905

necessary to achieve Brady’s due process aspirations.114 A consistent message of
these wide-ranging critiques, however, is the doctrine’s present failure to impose a
demanding burden on the prosecutor.115
Yet, this scholarship competes with the drumbeat of the many sources that
proclaim Brady’s prosecutorial burden to be significant. Many, if not most, law
students will not have the opportunity to delve into the rich criticism that reveals
Brady’s shortcomings. Instead, they will enter the profession with an impression that
Brady imposes a special burden, unique to the American prosecutor—Brady is a case
that speaks to our identity as to the values we hold.116 This inflated, unearned
narrative in turn confers a benefit to prosecutors by lending legitimacy to outcomes
and promoting “the system’s capacity to adjudicate guilt more reliably.”117
C. Political Benefits: A Shield Against Legislative Efforts to Expand Pretrial
Discovery
In assessing the potential benefits of Brady to prosecutors, another use of the case
emerges: its deployment to achieve policy objectives. When the Criminal Committee
in the early 2000s considered making amendments to pretrial rules governing the
exchange of information, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was well positioned to
lobby for its preferences. The DOJ is formally represented on the Criminal
Committee, and in addition, DOJ representatives are permitted to voice concerns
directly to the Criminal Committee.118 The use of Brady as a vehicle to influence any
changes by the Committee did not occur until the early 2000s, when it became a
centerpiece over the state of pretrial discovery in criminal disputes. In some ways,
Brady’s lack of earlier influence on the rulemaking process reflects its quiet reception
and the impression that the case had little to do with the Committee’s work, which

State’s obligation to disclose evidence”); Medwed, supra note 3, at 1540 (noting that Brady
was intended to be “broad” in its requirements).
114. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 106, at 512, 514 (proposing an open-file disclosure
requirement that requires disclosure of inculpatory and exculpatory evidence); Medwed, supra
note 3, 1158–59 (proposing the possibility of an open-file disclosure requirement to counteract
the doctrine’s inherent flaws); Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After
Connick and Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1376–77 (2012) (proposing an open-file
regime to replace Brady); Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 295 (observing that changes “in
discovery obligations from less of a ‘cat and mouse game’ to relatively open discovery would
afford the true believer less opportunity to stretch ethical boundaries”).
115. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 3 at 686 (“[O]ne is struck by the dissonance between
Brady’s grand expectations to civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely
unfulfilled promise”); id. at 713 (discussing how the materiality standard’s lack of any rigor
“in practice rendered suppression of favorable evidence a routine and rational act”); Moore,
supra note 114, at 1376–77 (“From Brady’s inception onward, constitutional doctrine has
prioritized deference to prosecutorial discretion over enforceability.”).
116. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 108, at 907 (including Brady among cases
representing the “Warren Court’s progressive constitutional revolution at the peak of its
energy and transformative power”); Hochman, supra note 92, at 1674 (“The Brady rule rests
on the notion that a criminal trial is a search for the truth.”).
117. Kogan & Robertson, supra note 113, at 525–26.
118. Id.
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was to regulate information exchange during the pretrial (versus trial) phase of
litigation.119
1. The Legislative Process Encounters Brady
Consistent with Brady’s quiet arrival, as the Criminal Committee convened and
considered its rulemaking agenda after Brady was decided, there was no mention of
the case.120 This silence was even more pronounced given that key terms in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) mirrored terms in the Brady standard.
Where Brady required disclosure of “material” information, so did the FRCP. In
1946, the original version of Rule 16, for example, provided a defendant could
request the court order the prosecutor to permit the examination of “material”
documents that were seized from defendant or third parties.121 Nevertheless, after the
Court announced the Brady decision, the Committee did not think the decision
sufficiently notable to merit mention in the meetings immediately following the case.
In the 1960s, academics and jurists began calling attention to the disparity
between civil and criminal discovery.122 Gideon’s mandate had propagated public-

119. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50.
120. Minutes from Rules Committee meetings between 1963 and 1967 make not a single
mention of Brady. See THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (Oct.
14–16, 1963), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-1963-min.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NJ6C-5A6Z]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING
MINUTES (Jan. 13–15, 1964), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR011964-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD8G-88ND]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES,
MEETING MINUTES (May 3–4, 1965), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/C
R05-1965-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/W76D-9ELF]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL
RULES, MEETING MINUTES (May 23, 1966), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_im
port/CR05-1966-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W2X-ZND3]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON
CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (Sept. 11–12, 1967), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/def
ault/files/fr_import/CR09-1967-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XRF-4D89]. Though proposals
initiated in 1961 did not finalize until 1966, Brady’s publication in 1963 had no discernible
impact on Committee discussions. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING
MINUTES 8–13 (Jan. 13–14, 1964), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR
01-1964-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2S2-6KHE] (relating to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, proposing
disclosure of defendant’s statements, results of relevant examinations, and defendant’s
recorded grand-jury testimony). The Committee did refer to and discuss other
contemporaneous cases in determining appropriate changes; for example, in 1967, the
Committee discussed Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 94 (1967), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (SEPT. 11–
12, 1967), supra, at 3, 14.
121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1946) (last amended 2013).
122. See, e.g., Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 293 (1960); Goldstein, supra note 50; Hall, supra note 48; Sheldon Krantz, Pretrial
Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REV. 127,
144–51 (1963); David W. Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of
Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 921, 927–28 (1961); Comment, Developments in the Law—
Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1057 (1961) (recommending exchange of witness lists
coupled with opportunity to depose witnesses); Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal
Cases, 60 Yale L.J. 626, 640–46 (1951) (recommending adoption of civil discovery, including
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defender offices, and from these ranks emerged a more organized push for criminal
discovery.123 Congress proposed a bill in 1966 that “would direct the Supreme Court,
[and therefore the Advisory Committee] to make adequate discovery rules.”124 In
1968, the Committee amended Rule 16 to include documents “material” to the
“preparation of [the] defense,” a change that reflected political currents favoring the
expansion of pretrial criminal discovery.125 And yet, despite the shared language, one
could sense the Committee’s wariness about Brady’s significance to the FRCP—
meeting notes in 1968 indicate, “Brady v. Maryland should be left to the development
of the case law and should not be in the rule. A note should be added to the effect
[that] the committee is not attempting to codify Brady v. Maryland at present.”126 In
recognizing the case’s nonapplication to pretrial discovery, the Committee was still
acknowledging Brady’s shadow.
The Committee would in fact note this sentiment in its annotation to the 1976
Amendment to the FRCP.127 By then, Rule 16 was changed to remove the court as
an obstacle; a defendant only needed to issue a request to the prosecutor to initiate
the requirement that the State turn over documents material to the preparation of the
defense.128 What, if any, was Brady’s impact on this obligation? The Committee was
vague: “[T]he committee had ‘decided not to codify the Brady Rule.’ . . . [But] ‘the
requirement that the government disclose documents and tangible objects “material
to the preparation of his defense” underscores the importance of disclosure of
evidence favorable to the defendant.’”129 Some courts would interpret Rule 16’s
materiality limitation to require a broader sweep of information than Brady, while
other courts would interpret Rule 16’s demand to be coterminous with Brady.130 In

depositions). A few judges explicitly recognized disparities between civil and criminal
procedure. Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 228, 233 (1964).
123. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2192 (2002)
(noting Gideon led to a growth in public defender offices); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual
Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419,
2426, n.33 (noting rapid expansion of public defender offices after Gideon). Vermont and
Florida afforded discovery rights to criminal defendants in the 1960s. 1961 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 174–76; In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 211 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1968); Peter
Forbes Langrock, Vermont’s Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A. J. 732, 732 (1967).
124. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (May 23, 1966), supra
note 120, at 7.
125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b) (1968) (last amended 2013).
126. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 15 (Sept. 30–Oct. 1,
1968) (emphasis added), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR09-1968min.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJV7-8UJG]; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
127. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1976) (advisory committee’s note to its amendment effective
1976).
128. See id.
129. LAURAL L. HOOPER, JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, TREATMENT OF BRADY V.
MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND
POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 2 (2004) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1975).

908

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:883

some respects, this split was a tempest in a teapot; in the end, Rule 16 provided for
little more than it did in 1946, given that Rule 16’s expansion to include all
documents in the prosecutor’s “possession, custody, and control” 131 was diminished
by a provision that relieved the prosecutor from disclosing police reports—a
sweeping exemption.132 Compared to civil discovery, the amendments were anemic:
no criminal rule was in sight of civil rules that empowered parties to compel the
disclosure of relevant information through powerful tools.133
Within these inconsequential moves of the dial on criminal pretrial discovery,
Brady’s role in rulemaking was uncertain, which was evident by the Committee’s
struggle to contextualize Brady. The Committee seemed inclined to treat Brady as a
floor, not a ceiling. At the same time, the Committee avoided a declaration of
independence from Brady. On display was Brady’s power to disorient the process of
constructing pretrial discovery, even as Brady had, according to the Court, nothing
to do with pretrial discovery. However momentarily the Committee might have been
inspired to expand pretrial discovery in the late 1960s, it did not stray far from
Brady’s articulation of due process, and it built in the doctrine as a reference point.
If Brady had nothing to do with pretrial discovery, it also seemed to superintend and
constrain it.
2. Prosecutors Learn to Wield Brady
The Court’s decision in United States v. Ruiz explicitly relieved prosecutors from
making any Brady disclosure in a case that resolved by plea.134 Although Ruiz was
consistent with prior decisions of the Court that announced Brady’s obligation was

131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
132. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2); ROBERT M. CARY, CRAIG D. SINGER & SIMON A.
LATCOVICH, FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 135–36 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2011).
133. Meyn, supra note 79, at 1094 (distinguishing discretion given to civil litigants from
limited disclosures extended to criminal defendants); Jeffrey E. Stone & Corey B. Rubenstein,
Criminal Discovery: Leveling the Playing Field, 23 LITIG. 45, 45 (1997) (observing that, under
the federal rules, a defendant is entitled to “(1) any statement [he] was foolish enough to make
. . . (2) his criminal record . . . (3) documents . . . to be used by the government at trial; (4)
reports of examinations . . . and (5) expert witness summaries. State prosecutors often have
similar discovery obligations . . . .”). The rules do not “require the parties to disclose
witnesses.” CARY ET AL., supra note 132, at 417. Views on changes to federal rules widely
differ. Compare Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 570
(2013) (“The 1966 amendments . . . hugely increased the range and scope of pretrial discovery
. . . .”), with Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to
Improve the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 641, 652–53 (1989) (contending 1966 reciprocity provision
advantaged the State), Meyn, supra note 79, at 1135–36 (observing no amendment has ever
provided defendant discretionary discovery), and Sara Kropf, Andrew George, William C.
Cleveland & Julie Rubenstein, The ‘Chief’ Problem with Reciprocal Discovery Under Rule
16, CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 20, 20 (arguing Rule 16 is harmful to defendants). Rule
16(a)(2) exempts most police reports from disclosure. Doctrinal treatment has also narrowed
scope of rules. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996) (giving
“material to the preparation of [his] defense” a tight frame).
134. 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
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limited to trial,135 the Court’s “we mean what we say” moment in Ruiz stunned the
many who had assumed Brady meant something more. After all, coursebooks, and
prosecutors and defendants rallied around the idea that Brady required something
special of the prosecutor, distinct from other litigants in the American system, and
distinct from prosecutors around the world.136 Although the Court in Ruiz announced
that Brady’s wet blanket on due process (which was always there) was in fact there,
the decision also inspired action. Notably, the opinion moved the American College
of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) to attempt to persuade the Criminal Committee to expand
pretrial disclosures to defendants. ACTL submitted to the Committee a report
entitled, “Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information Under
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure” (“ACTL Report”),137 drafted by ACTL’s
Committee on Federal Procedure, which included Judge Charles Breyer (Northern
District of California), R. Stan Mortenson (President Nixon’s former attorney), Ty
Cobb (President Trump’s former attorney), and white-collar defense attorneys like
John Cooney, Robert Tarun, Thomas Dwyer, and Douglas Young.138 The opening
salvo reads:
In the 1963 landmark decision of Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
held that prosecutors have a constitutional duty to turn over “evidence
favorable to an accused. . . . [sic] where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment.” Four decades later, [the federal rules that] govern
federal plea negotiations and criminal discovery . . . still do not address,
let alone require, the government to timely disclose favorable
information to the defendant that is material to either guilt or sentencing.
Without a clear definition of favorable evidence nor a disclosure
timetable, prosecutors have interpreted the constitutional discovery
obligation inconsistently and too often disclosed favorable information
on the eve, during, or after trial or not at all.139
The ACTL Report emphasized how pretrial disclosure of information is critical
to ensuring a fair process of plea bargaining and that the early disclosure of
information favorable to a defendant is essential to obtaining legitimate outcomes,
due to its impact on plea negotiations.140
ACTL’s proposal claimed to codify Brady in the pretrial space. In fact, ACTL
attempted to broaden the disclosure obligation to information “favorable” to
defendant. Thus, the ACTL Report sought to move the boundary lines of Brady in

135. See supra text accompanying notes 61–67.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 88–95.
137. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE OF
FAVORABLE INFORMATION UNDER FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 AND 16 (2003).
138. The American College of Trial Lawyers states that membership “is extended only by
invitation . . . to those experienced trial lawyers [with a minimum 15 years of experience] . . .
whose professional careers have been marked by the highest standards . . . .” Fellowship in the
College, AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS (2019), https://www.actl.com/home/membership
[https://perma.cc/4QLS-BPWK].
139. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 138, at 1 (quoting Brady v.
Maryland, 372 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
140. Id. at 1–2.
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terms of timing (as early as two weeks after a complaint was filed) and scope
(removing the materiality requirement and rendering any relevant information
favorable to defendant discoverable).141 The proposal was reasonable, argued ACTL,
given that robust discovery rights were granted to civil litigants: “It is anomalous that
in civil cases, where generally all that is at stake is money, access to information is
assured; however, in contrast, in criminal cases, where liberty is at issue, the defense
is provided far less information.”142 The Criminal Committee put the ACTL Report
on its agenda.143 ACTL, then, in arguing for pretrial discovery, had attempted to
weaponize Brady—arguing that, due to Brady’s inadequate obligations, the
Committee needed to intervene in the pretrial discovery space.
Minutes of the Committee’s first full meeting in May 2004 indicate that Member
Donald J. Goldberg (who practiced white-collar defense) “agreed with the
Department of Justice’s view that Brady is really a post-trial rule.”144 The DOJ
liaison, Deborah J. Rhodes, objected that “the proposed amendment is inconsistent
with the case law and would transform a trial right into a discovery right, which
conflicts with the Jencks Act.”145 The Committee voted to further investigate
ACTL’s proposal, appointing a subcommittee; notably Goldberg and Rhodes, along
with three others, were placed on the subcommittee.
The Committee met five months later. The DOJ attempted a new framing:
prosecutors already practiced what the proposal required.146 Proponents of ACTL’s
proposal had an easy retort: if prosecutors already did what the proposed rule
required, what harm was there in adopting the proposal?147 This question, however
rational, ignored the real stakes at issue. The proposed rule threatened the sanctity of
the prosecutor’s minister-of-justice role that conferred privileges of self-regulation

141. The ACTL Report’s proposal
contains no requirement that the information be “material” to the defense. . . .
[That] “[i]nformation favorable to the defendant” is sufficiently clear to guide
the government attorneys at the pre-trial stage. [And, in addition, a] materiality
standard is only appropriate in the context of an appellate review since
determinations of materiality are best made in light of all the evidence addressed
at trial.
Id. at 20.
142. Id. at 11.
143. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 12 (May 6–7, 2004),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR5-2004_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG
U8-3XJZ].
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. The Jencks Act requires the prosecutor to turn over a statement of a government’s
witness after that witness has testified. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2018). In requiring the disclosure
after a witness has testified, the Act has been interpreted to relieve a prosecutor from turning
over such information at an earlier date. Some conflicts arise as to whether the prosecutor’s
Brady obligation (to divulge exculpatory impeachment evidence before trial, for example)
trumps the Jencks Act, which requires a prior statement of a witness after testimony. United
States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 117 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004).
146. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 7 (Oct. 30, 2004),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM
L6-3PWE].
147. Id.
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and an absence of external accountability measures. In the next meeting, the DOJ
objected to the proposed rule’s scope (that a prosecutor turn over information
“favorable to defendant”) as it was “difficult to distinguish between inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence” (even though Rhodes had earlier argued that adequate
protection was offered by Brady, which was somehow clear even though it requires
a prosecutor turn over “exculpatory” evidence).148 The DOJ’s arguments led to an
October 2005 dilution of ACTL’s proposal:
[U]pon a defendant’s request, the government must make available no
later than the start of trial all information that is known to the government
. . . that the government has reason to believe may be favorable to the
defendant because it tends to be either exculpatory or impeaching. The
court may order disclosure earlier, but in no instance more than 14 days
before trial.149
The DOJ was still opposed, however, objecting that the amendment went “well
beyond the constitutional standard identified by Supreme Court case law.”150
Viewing Brady as a ceiling on the prosecutor’s affirmative disclosure obligations,
the DOJ was deploying the doctrine to defeat efforts to expand discovery in the
pretrial period.
The DOJ proposed a compromise; in exchange for dropping the proposal, the DOJ
would consider integrating the proposal’s language for “possible inclusion in the
U.S. Attorney’s Manual.”151 In April 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty
attended Committee discussions, representing that the DOJ had circulated revisions
to the manual “as an alternative to amending Rule 16.”152 The amended manual
would require prosecutors “to weigh materiality before disclosing . . . but
[prosecutors] would be encouraged to construe materiality broadly.”153 Proponents
of the proposal still thought a rule would better ensure compliance, but the DOJ’s
suggestion had some effect, as Committee support for the proposal weakened. The
issue was tabled.
In September 2006, the DOJ informed the Committee that the manual had
received approval from “all relevant Department officials, including Deputy

148. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 6–7 (Apr. 4–5, 2005),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR04-2005-min.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7VQU-P53U].
149. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 9 (Oct. 24–25, 2005),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2005-min.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BNF2-VHKG]. Rhodes contended that such a disclosure could not occur earlier than trial
because “between 93 and 96 percent of federal cases result[] in a plea rather than a trial[, so]
it is critical that lay witnesses be exposed only in those cases that actually proceed to trial.” Id.
at 11.
150. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 10.
152. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 9 (April 3–4, 2006),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR04-2006-min.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6AR6-G94S].
153. Id. at 10.
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Attorney General Paul McNulty.”154 The DOJ acknowledged that the manual did not
track the Committee’s proposal but emphasized that amending the language was a
“substantial step.”155 The DOJ made clear it would oppose the proposal if it went any
further; this position seemed to reinvigorate the Committee, which voted to send the
proposed language (however diluted) to the Standing Committee (for referral to
Congress).156 Deputy Attorney General McNulty strongly opposed the proposal
during its presentation to the Standing Committee, which rejected the proposal.157
The Standing Committee “suggested that the . . . [C]ommittee consider whether to
continue studying the . . . proposal.”158 Further time passed; the Federal Judicial
Center reported that its study found no evidence of widespread noncompliance with
Brady—a premise that had no relationship to the motivations of the ACTL Report,
which was to ensure that obligations under Brady be exceeded to include pretrial
disclosures.159
In April 2009, Judge Emmet Sullivan, who presided over the trial of a U.S.
Senator that involved severe Brady violations,160 wrote to the Committee urging
them to reconsider the pretrial codification of Brady.161 Immediately, the DOJ
reiterated opposition to any pretrial expansion of the rules, with Brady as the
centerpiece, noting a change going beyond Brady’s doctrinal requirements would be
“inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, would upset the careful
congressionally-mandated balance inherent in criminal discovery under the Jencks
Act, and would disregard critical interests such as the rights and safety of witnesses
and special concerns relating to cases implicating national security.”162 The DOJ now
offered to create a position within the DOJ to direct and oversee prosecutorial
discovery obligations under Brady.163 In the face of continued resistance from the
DOJ, in April of 2011, the subcommittee reported that it had “been unable to agree
on any acceptable amendment.”164 The Committee discussed the efforts made by the
DOJ to manage prosecutorial discovery obligations, including the appointment of a

154. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 2 (Sept. 5, 2006),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR09-2006-min.pdf [https://perma.cc
/H6NG-HNBZ].
155. Id.
156. Id. at 7.
157. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 5 (Oct. 1–2, 2007),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2007-min.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GX2G-27R6].
158. Id.
159. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 138.
160. Anna Stolley Persky, A Cautionary Tale: The Ted Stevens Prosecution, WASH. LAW.
(Oct. 2009), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/oct
ober-2009-ted-stevens.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z86V-G3XC].
161. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 5 (Oct. 13, 2009),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2009-min.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JG5E-C3CF].
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id.
164. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 11 (Apr. 11–12,
2011),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/criminal-min-04-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EYY-3AUB].
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National Criminal Discovery Coordinator, law enforcement personnel training,
electronic management of discovery, and instituting a policy of “[w]hen in doubt,
disclose.”165 The Committee voted 6–5 against a proposed expansion of pretrial
discovery.166
The DOJ had effectively used Brady—which the DOJ in individual cases
routinely and vigorously argues has absolutely no bearing on pretrial discovery167—
to constitute the ceiling for all discovery, whether pretrial or trial. The courts,
however, were clear that Brady left pretrial discovery to legislative regulation. And
the Committee’s process was legislative in nature. Yet, the DOJ was arguing that
Brady foreclosed any legislative expansion of pretrial discovery. The minimum
discovery required by due process at trial, according to the DOJ, was the maximum
discovery required of prosecutors.
Completing the circle, the DOJ’s reliance on Brady to justify unilateral control
over the pretrial period reveals Brady’s legitimizing power—that is, Brady lent
constitutional legitimacy to the dramatic transfer of power over information from the
judge to the prosecutor after procedural reform in the 1940s. As legislative reform
expanded prosecutorial power still more, the dominant narrative of Brady—that it is
a landmark case that constrained the prosecutor and gave constitutional heft to the
prosecutor’s role as minister of justice—has been used as a means to validate this
expansion of power. These benefits conferred by Brady to prosecutorial interests are
arguably substantial.
III. ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS QUESTIONS NOT ADDRESSED BY BRADY
Flipping the script on Brady—that the doctrine ceded constitutional regulation of
the pretrial period to the prosecutor, legitimized case outcomes through narrative
overstatement of its burden, and was effectively used to achieve legislative objectives
of the DOJ—recasts Brady as a potential prosecutorial ally and a threat to adversarial
balance. In this reframing, the Court’s “restraint” in limiting due process review to
the trial moment after the legislature had ceded control over pretrial discovery to the
prosecutor can be understood as judicial appeasement to prosecutorial interests.
The reframing of Brady as a doctrine that allows a prosecutor to withhold
information during the pretrial period invites reassessment of due process norms.
ACTL was not alone in raising the alarm about the disparity in information exchange
between civil and criminal disputes. The Court’s assertion that Brady does not
govern pretrial proceedings, for example, is now contested by a significant number
of federal jurisdictions that, by local rule, require Brady material to be disclosed

165. Id. at 11.
166. Id. at 15. Instead, the Committee went forward with their attempt to influence more
“soft” practices like the Federal Judicial Center bench book and DOJ policy changes. Id. at
15–16.
167. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No.
01-595), 2002 WL 657759 (“Respondent contends that the court of appeals’ holding that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to receive material exculpatory information before
pleading guilty is supported by [Brady]. But Brady and the decisions applying it hold no more
than that the government has a duty to disclose exculpatory information when such disclosure
is necessary to ensure a fair trial.”).
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during, and sometimes early in, the pretrial period.168 As the battle over Brady’s
timing continues, in some ways the war has been won by prosecutorial interests. As
long as the focus remains on Brady, then what information due process actually
requires in criminal litigation is defined by Brady.169 And Brady is a weak taskmaster
compared to the pretrial information demands of civil litigation. Meanwhile, the
consolidation of prosecutorial power during the pretrial period has become complete.
The prosecutor now serves as both a party to the lawsuit and the arbitrator of facts
and law.170 The confluence of “the prosecutor’s investigating, charging, convicting,
and sentencing powers,” coupled with “the ‘inherent inequality’ between the
prosecutor and the defendant,” as Bennett Gershman observed, has rendered “the
adversary system almost obsolete.”171 David Sklansky portrayed the prosecutor as an
intermediary between “law and politics, rules and discretion, courts and police,
advocacy and objectivity”—a boundary-blurring position that necessarily
consolidates power.172 The prosecutorial-burden narrative works to deflect concern
over this consolidation and helps justify the prosecutorial impulse to insist on selfgovernance.173 Thus, as scholarship, the Criminal Committee, and judges continue
to raise questions over Brady’s timing and scope, alternative due process approaches
deserve consideration.

168. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 129, at 12; Daniel McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution
in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 105 (2017).
169. Burke, supra note 106, at 483 (recognizing the value of sustained scholarly efforts to
improve effectiveness and enforcement but concluding that a significant doctrinal shift is
required to achieve the due process promise of Brady).
170. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2118 (1998) (observing how the prosecutor role had morphed into including the
role as arbitrator).
171. Gershman, supra note 50, at 395. These circumstances permit prosecutors to engage
in coercive tactics to secure pleas. See Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 223, 225 (2006).
172. David Alan Sklansky, Criminology: The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power,
106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 520 (2016); see also Daniel Epps, Adversarial
Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 783 (2016) (contending the
dualistic role of the prosecutor is confusing and does not serve the ends of justice).
173. The temptation to prosecutors to consolidate power has been a constant one. Examples
abound: In 1931, the presidentially appointed Wickersham Commission wondered if “the
prosecutor’s office were properly organized, [whether] no public defender would be required,”
as a prosecutor considers the welfare of the State, and the accused is a member of the State.
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 33 (1931). The
prosecutorial charge to represent “the people” rendered the defense attorney superfluous, given
that defendant was part of the people. In 1989, for example, the United States Attorney General
in a “Memorandum to All Justice Department Litigators” announced that prosecutors would
be exempt from the prohibition on contacting persons represented by counsel, alleviating
prosecutors of ethical constraints that apply to the rest of the bar. The self-conception of being
exceptional was expressed early by Gershman, supra note 50, at 403 (citing Memorandum to
All Justice Dep’t Litigators from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney Gen. (June 8, 1989)).
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A. Can the Prosecutor Withhold Pretrial Information?
Brady is not understood to allow prosecutors to withhold pretrial information with
constitutional impunity, regardless of the information’s value to a criminal
defendant. But Brady allows that. Most of all criminal cases—ninety-five percent—
resolve pretrial, the period in which the Court in Brady ceded governance over
discovery to the legislature. Due process doctrine constitutionally permits the
prosecutor to withhold relevant, material, exculpatory, and inculpatory information
during the pretrial phrase, as well as information that bears on the credibility of
witnesses or the reliability of documents. Under these constitutional nonconditions,
a number of jurisdictions have opted to provide for no pretrial disclosures.174 In these
jurisdictions, prosecutors wield unilateral control over the development and
distribution of pretrial information. This allowance permits the prosecutor to make
representations of fact that are not supported by the State’s file, which again, would
not constitute a due process violation.
If the perception is that Brady imposes a significant burden on the prosecutor, the
question might be asked: compared to whom? But this question, under current
doctrine, is not permitted. This is the power of Medina v. California, a criminal case
in which the Court rejected a due process analysis that would invite comparative
evaluations of procedural systems outside of the criminal arena.175 In the civil arena,
such comparative evaluations are embedded in the doctrinal approach. For example,
the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly articulated three factors to assess due process, the
second of which involves a comparative assessment: (1) the litigant’s interest at
stake; (2) the fairness of existing procedures and probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest at stake.176 This second factor permits
a court to consider analogous systems of adjudication that are used to resolve similar
disputes.177 The approach in Goldberg was momentarily applied to criminal cases in
Ake v. Oklahoma, allowing a court to examine features of civil disputes to assist in
determining the fairness of criminal procedures.178 But Ake was superseded by

174. Statutorily, disclosure obligations are triggered by the onset of trial in a number of
jurisdictions. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-4 (2013); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 12(b), 16; WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 971.23 (West 2017).
175. 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
176. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). A balancing test permits broad discretion, providing opportunity
for a court to weigh each factor differently or to omit different considerations within each
factor. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (following Goldberg, 397 U.S.
254); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (criminal case following Mathews,
424 U.S. 319). In In Re Winship, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden was compared to the
“preponderance” standard applied in civil disputes. 397 U.S. 358, 370–71 (1970).
177. There are identical features between the civil, criminal, and administrative systems.
Because of the similarities, these systems can be compared to measure additional safeguards.
See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (looking to criminal indigency determination in
civil contempt proceedings); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, No. 05-C-580, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29232 (E.D. Wisc. Mar. 31, 2007) (looking to civil discovery rules in an
administrative hearing).
178. See Ake, 470 U.S. 68. Civil rules provide a functional, alternative mode of adjudication
for comparison. Meyn, supra note 6, at 734. So much so, that rules of civil procedure were
first proposed to govern criminal disputes. Id. Others acknowledge pretrial civil litigation
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Medina, Justice Kennedy contending that criminal law was special, given what he
observed to be its comprehensive treatment within the Constitution.179
Pretrial civil procedure in particular is analogous to criminal disputes; commonlaw tradition is an appropriate consideration in due process examinations,180 and
before federal reform in the 1930s, civil and criminal pretrial procedure shared a
similar structure.181 Should a civil to criminal comparison proceed, what would it
potentially reveal? The adequacy of criminal procedures to develop and interrogate
pretrial information would be tested against civil procedures, which for eighty years
have followed a different trajectory.182 The length of this trajectory has significance
to a due process review; entrenched norms can be understood to create minimum
expectations of process.183 As in criminal litigation, the legislative process has
defined what pretrial information is exchanged in civil disputes. No civil court has
found that the civil pretrial discovery regime is constitutionally required. But the
legislature in the civil arena created a different world with which it conceived of an
alternative conception of what process is due184—thus providing substantial guidance
as to the value of alternative procedures that are available to govern the exchange of
pretrial information.
What, for example, might transpire if a state legislature amended civil procedure
to deprive civil litigants of discovery tools? Corporations’ and the plaintiffs’ bar
would not go gently into the night. Civil litigants, under any reasonable scenario,
would claim that pretrial discovery, legislatively granted for over eighty years in
every state and federal jurisdiction in the United States, was so entrenched as to be
fundamental—citing to the principles of transparency, notice, and deliberation that
justified reform in the 1930s—and that its denial would offend due process. And if
these civil litigants were correct that these embedded norms do define present notions
of minimum due process (after all, wrote Justice O’Connor, due process was

shares deep DNA with criminal litigation. Lynch, supra note 170, at 2120–21 (“[The] essential
structure [of] a criminal case is nothing more than an ordinary [civil] lawsuit.”).
179. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 (“In our view, the Mathews balancing test does not provide
the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which . . . are
part of the criminal process.”). Another variant of Kennedy’s approach is taken up by Judge
Gerard Lynch, who wrote that any due process consideration should be assessed according to
the current system’s “own implicit premises, rather than in comparison to an idealized
adversarial model.” Lynch, supra note 170, at 2121. Lynch is correct that no doctrine requires
comparison to a procedural ideal; but what about comparison to a similar procedural analogue?
180. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445–46 (“[B]ecause the States have considerable expertise in
matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of commonlaw tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to legislative judgments in this
area.”).
181. Meyn, supra note 6, at 699.
182. See Section I.B.1.
183. Medina, 505 U.S. at 446 (“Historical practice is probative of whether a procedural rule
can be characterized as fundamental” as well as “settled tradition.”); id. at 447 (finding the
holdings in cases eighty-five years old to be relevant to the Court’s due process inquiry); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (finding that the requirement of “guilt of a criminal charge
be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is so entrenched in common-law
jurisdictions that it creates minimum expectations of due process).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47.
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“perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to history and the
most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society”185), why
would depriving criminal defendants of these same entitlements comport with due
process where cases determine whether an individual should be incarcerated? Why
would the lack of discovery in criminal litigation be adequate where discovery rights
are essential to civil litigation and where the stakes for litigants are, at the least,
commensurate?
Under Medina, courts are on firm ground in avoiding the comparison to civil
litigation that Goldberg would permit. Although Medina frees courts from engaging
with analogous systems, courts still envision comparisons but resort to imaginary
worlds. A common projection is a world governed by Brady; the other world is one
that provides a defendant unfettered access to everything.186 In Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, for example, the Court stated, “[a] defendant’s right to discover exculpatory
evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth’s files.”187 In Moore v. Illinois, the Court stated there is “no
constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed
accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.”188 Courts make
these sweeping statements as they ignore what occurs across the hall, where civil
litigants exchange information according to a rule-bound process superintended by
opposing counsel and ultimately the judge. Other slippery slope scenarios find
expression in the criminal arena. Some courts, for example, maintain that transferring
the role of supervising Brady from the prosecutor to a judge would be “extremely
time-consuming” for judges who are “too busy,” with little benefit in terms of
compliance.189 This view again ignores the functional, party-driven discovery regime
in civil litigation, which is ultimately refereed by a (however busy) trial court.
In a few instances, litigants have asked courts to consider importing rules over the
criminal/civil divide. In United States v. Sierra Pacific Industries, a civil case, the
defendant sought post-conviction relief under Brady.190 The court rejected the
attempt, stating that the due process interest of a civil defendant paled in comparison
to a criminal defendant.191 Yet, the court’s analysis belied its conclusion, finding the
civil defendant was protected by existing civil pretrial procedures (that exceeded
Brady’s requirements): “The expansive right to discovery in civil cases and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . provided [the civil] defendants with

185. Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 551 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
186. Burke, supra note 106, at 486 (“[R]equiring the prosecution to disclose everything
that might influence a jury would amount to a constitutionally mandated open file policy,
which the Court has repeatedly refused to impose as a component of due process.”); see also
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976).
187. 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987).
188. 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972).
189. Bibas, supra note 106, at 141.
190. 100 F. Supp. 3d 948, 956 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
191. Id. at 957 (“The ‘requirement of due process . . . in safeguarding the liberty of the
citizen against deprivation through the action of the State, embodies the fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.’” (quoting
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935))).
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constitutionally adequate process to mount an effective and meaningful defense to
this civil action.”192 One is left wondering: if the pretrial civil rules provide a
constitutionally adequate procedure to mount an effective defense, is it really
possible that the absence of such rules in criminal litigation is constitutionally
adequate? In Sierra Pacific, the court breezily credits the value that an opportunity
to develop a pretrial record has to a litigant at trial; but, in the criminal context, courts
pretend this obvious connection does not exist and instead imbue trial with a
talismanic, error-cleansing, fact-developing status.
How can a constitutionally less-protected civil defendant be entitled to more
pretrial information, and the criminal defendant, who is entitled to greater
constitutional protection, be entitled to less pretrial information? This paradox is in
part given legitimacy by the popular view of Brady, which imagines an idealized
version of trial: should a criminal defendant elect to advance to trial, he avails himself
of the panoply of powerful rights that the Constitution affords (but this is really no
different than a trial in a civil case).193 This persistent fiction (rejected by civil
procedure scholars)194 that trial somehow substitutes for pretrial interrogation of the
record permits the Brady doctrine’s legitimacy. And yet the Brady doctrine punches
well above its weight, broadcasting a perception of burden that well exceeds its actual
requirements of the prosecutor.
The faulty premise that pretrial proceedings do not significantly influence trials
was rebutted during the reform to civil procedure, thirty years before the Court
decided Brady.195 Reformers to civil procedure viewed the trial as a continuation of
pretrial proceedings and believed that adopting a pretrial discovery phase profoundly
informed the quality and nature of any subsequent trial. Civil reformers
acknowledged that pretrial preparation is essential to fair settlements and fair trials;
the pretrial interrogation of claims and defenses is actually the function of the
adversarial system. Yet the Court, itself integral to the creation of the civil procedure
template, has continued to maintain that, in criminal disputes, trial exists in a vacuum.
A due process doctrine that credited what is obvious—pretrial discovery’s essential
role to an adversary process’s operation—would compare the prosecutor’s unilateral

192. Id. at 958 (emphasis added).
193. Trial forces the prosecutor to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt and conveys
to the defendant the right to confront witnesses and the right not to testify. As to the higher
burden of proof, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 293
(2013) (contending juries merely determine who presents the most plausible story). As to a
defendant testifying or not testifying, he is damned if he does (experienced prosecutor will
destroy on cross-examination) and damned if he does not (jury will draw the impermissible
inference he is not testifying because he is guilty).
194. Id. at 315–19.
195. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80–89
(1989); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 711 (1998); see also THE ADVISORY
COMM., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 45–46 (1937),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV04-1937.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CP
Z-XLSL].
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control over the pretrial record to the due process entitlements (and maybe rights)
that are currently granted to civil defendants.
B. Can the Prosecutor Be a Judge in Her Own Case?
A related, narrower due process question emerges: what degree of decisionmaking power in litigation should one party be permitted to the exclusion of the other
party? At common law, the trial court as gatekeeper could require the prosecutor to
describe factual allegations to the court’s satisfaction. After federal reform to
criminal procedure in 1946,196 the power to determine the sufficiency of the pretrial
factual record was transferred from the judiciary to the executive. Importation of
notice pleading to criminal disputes removed the trial court’s pretrial role and
conferred unprecedented control over the pretrial record to the prosecutor, providing
significantly less notice, transparency, and deliberation during the pretrial phase than
the civil system. As a result, power over the pretrial record, as well as over pretrial
dynamics, was transferred from the judge to the prosecutor, from the judiciary to the
executive, and from a neutral adjudicator to one party to a dispute.197
Brady legitimized this pretrial transfer of power from the judiciary to the
executive through its subsilencio validation of this procedural design. Professor John
Orth observed a fundamental tenant of due process prohibits any law that makes one
“[j]udge and party.”198 Did the 1946 federal reform to criminal procedure do just
that? The question of whether a person can be a judge in her own case tests, as John
Orth writes, “the procedural fairness of any legal system by highlighting one of its
most essential features, whether cases are decided by an independent decision
maker.”199 Even Judge Gerard Lynch, who views the prosecutor’s increasing control
over the disposition of criminal cases as an “innovation” that absorbs inquisitorial
features to permit system-wide efficiency,200 wondered whether the arrangement
constituted a “perversion of the classic due process model.”201
The response to this question is that a prosecutor’s “minister-of-justice”
obligation mitigates due process concerns. In this role, prosecutors are charged with

196. See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WITH NOTES PREPARED AND
PROCEEDINGS (Alexander Holtzoff, ed. 1946).
197. Where a judge does still intervene, it has no application to the determination of witness
credibility and other critical issues to litigation. As to presiding over motions to suppress, filing
rates are low, rates of success even lower. See, e.g., Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the
Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 595
(conducting a tristate study (Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania) of 7767 felony cases: defendants
filed motions to suppress in eleven percent of cases with success in seventy cases).
198. JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 15 (2003).
199. Id.
200. Lynch’s assessment that the consolidation of prosecutorial power was necessary to
attend to the growing docket of criminal cases and to meet a crime wave that came on the tail
end of the tough-on-crime hysteria, which would soon give way to collective reassessment. A
fair number of scholars now contend that the consolidation of prosecutorial power achieved
more prosecutions independent of when the crime rate rose or fell and was thus a key
contributor to the crisis of mass incarceration. See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE
TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017).
201. Lynch, supra note 170, at 2121.
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stepping “out of their purely adversarial roles . . . [to] ensure justice is done.”202
Where actors typically answer to a neutral party for allegations of misfeasance,
prosecutors answer to self-reflection, sometimes internal review.203 Brady subscribes
to this view, implicitly holding that entrusting the distribution of any pretrial
information to one party somehow comports with due process. The minister-ofjustice role promotes internal prosecutorial review of issues that occur on legal and
ethical margins—those exact situations that a neutral party should step in as a
referee.204 The minister-of-justice role is suspiciously embraced by those burdened
by it. But what purpose does a judge serve if a “minister of justice” oversees
proceedings? To argue that the classic due process model is satisfied if proceedings
are overseen by a judge that has a stake in the litigation is to normalize the very
circumstances that would require, of an actual judge, recusal.
The procedural design of criminal litigation was not inevitable. The initial draft
of federal criminal procedure mirrored the civil-procedure template.205 Had this
version become law, it would have plainly influenced how lawyers, scholars, and
courts conceived of due process.206 But, this version was rejected. As a result, pretrial
design provides criminal defendants with rights that are far inferior to civil litigants.
This state of litigation became the new normal and in turn shaped conceptions of due
process.207
CONCLUSION
“No government official in America has as much unreviewable power and
discretion as the prosecutor,” wrote Stephanos Bibas.208 Brady might be viewed as a
building block of that story. Brady arguably served to bestow constitutional
validation to a national reform effort that afforded pretrial agency to a civil
defendant, but not a criminal defendant. The implicit compromise struck in Brady—
to impose a minor burden on the prosecutor at trial but to shield a prosecutor’s use

202. Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 151, 155 (2011).
203. For a thorough treatment of the prosecutor’s unreviewed decisions at multiple (and
critical) junctures along the litigation timeline, see DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION
COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012).
204. Epps, supra note 172, at 846–47.
205. But the possibility of this alternative reality was undermined by a Criminal Committee
controlled by prosecutorial interests. See Meyn, supra note 6 at 708; supra text accompanying
notes 45–50.
206. If something like Brady had still emerged, its role would be understood for what it
actually is, a right that provides a post-conviction remedy unique to criminal litigation that
guarantees material, exculpatory information is provided to defendant at the onset of trial.
207. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 48, 48–49 (2000). One theory of constitutional review is that the Court is not so much
a countermajoritarian institution; instead, it tends to divine the majority’s true self—as
Matthew Lassiter portrays the theory, the Court acts in a way “more democratic than the
legislative choices of elected representatives.” Matthew D. Lassiter, Does the Supreme Court
Matter? Civil Rights and the Inherent Politicization of Constitutional Law, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1401, 1405–06 (2005).
208. Bibas, supra note 58, at 960.
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of pretrial information from constitutional scrutiny—contributed to the expansion of
prosecutorial influence. And yet, outcomes are given legitimacy that in part flow
from the narrative that Brady imposes a significant burden on the prosecutor. And
despite the Court’s stating that the doctrine has no bearing on the pretrial moment,
the DOJ has effectively wielded Brady to defeat legislative proposals to expand
pretrial discovery. This Article asks, in addition to the prosecutorial burden narrative,
might Brady also be fairly represented as a prosecutorial ally.
A consensus is growing that criminal-justice conditions are unacceptable and that
blame for these conditions is partially attributable to the prosecutorial role.209 To
view Brady as a prosecutorial ally and a threat to adversarial balance invites a
reassessment of entrenched due process norms, providing an opportunity to have
meaningful discussions on reforming how criminal disputes are resolved.

209. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 200, at 206 (“[P]rosecutors have been and remain the
engines driving mass incarceration.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing
of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN L. REV. 869, 921 (2009); Alex
Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xiii n.69 (2015)
(“[P]rosecutors—more than cops, judges, or legislators—[are] the principal drivers of the
increase in the prison population.”); Sklansky, supra note 172, at 514; Ronald F. Wright,
Reinventing American Prosecution Systems, 46 CRIME & JUST. 395, 395–96 (2017)
(contending that prosecutors have used “power responsibly in many cases . . . . In other
contexts, however, prosecutors have produced troubling results in individual cases and noxious
trends in the criminal justice system as a whole,” and they “have contributed more than their
fair share to some remarkable failures in American criminal justice.”); Jeffrey Toobin, The
Milwaukee Experiment: What Can One Prosecutor Do About the Mass Incarceration of
African-Americans?, NEW YORKER (May 4, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine
/2015/05/11/the-milwaukee-experiment [https://perma.cc/SUT8-RVNG].

